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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
  This report provides an assessment of the scope of liability under federal and state law for 
economic loss in connection with the 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill.  In this context, the term 
“economic loss,” refers specifically to lost profits and earning capacity unrelated to any injury to 
one’s person or property.  For example, an oil spill that contaminates a fishery might cause 
economic loss to commercial fishermen who rely on it, even though neither the fishermen nor their 
property is harmed.   
Admiralty law and state tort law have traditionally set strict limits on liability for economic 
loss.  The Federal Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (“OPA”) has expanded this domain of liability by 
imposing strict liability on responsible parties for certain kinds of economic loss resulting from oil 
spills onto navigable waters and shorelines.  Under OPA, a person may obtain compensation for 
economic loss from a party responsible for a spill if she can prove that her loss is “due to” harm to 
property or resources that “result[s] from” the spill, irrespective of whether she owns that property 
or those resources.  This statutory language is best understood to allow recovery only by those 
economic loss claimants who can prove that they have suffered economic loss because a spill has 
damaged, destroyed or otherwise rendered physically unavailable to them property or resources that 
they have a right to put to commercial use.  Thus, if a spill were to deprive commercial fishermen of 
expected profits by killing fish they ordinarily would catch and sell, or by causing authorities to bar 
the fishermen from accessing those fish for a period of time, the fishermen would be entitled to 
recover.  By contrast, operators of beach resorts in areas physically unaffected by a spill, but that 
nonetheless suffer economic loss because of a general downturn in tourism resulting from the spill, 
are among those who are not entitled to recover under OPA.   
Liability for economic loss under the laws of the Gulf States appears to be no broader than 
liability under OPA, and in most instances narrower.   4 
 
I.  THE DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL AND THE GULF COAST CLAIMS FACILITY 
 
A. The  Spill   
On April 20, 2010, an explosion and fire occurred on the Deepwater Horizon drilling rig, 
located approximately 50 miles off the Louisiana coast.  The rig was owned by Transocean Ltd., and 
was operated under a lease by BP Exploration and Production, Inc., a subsidiary of BP, plc. (“BP”).  
Tragically, 11 workers were killed and 17 others injured.  The rig sunk two days later.  It soon 
became apparent that the well being drilled by the rig was leaking oil.  That leak was not staunched 
until almost three months later – July 15, 2010.
1   
  Between April 20 and July 15 an estimated 5 million barrels of oil – over 200 million gallons 
– entered Gulf waters.
2  The Deepwater Horizon spill (“the Spill”) was thus the largest ever to have 
occurred in U.S. waters.
3  How much of the released oil has been removed by a combination of 
natural processes and human intervention is unclear, with estimates varying widely.  Oil sludge and 
tar balls thought to be associated with the spill have been found on Gulf Coast beaches as far east as 
the Florida Panhandle and as far west as Texas.  
 
B.  The Gulf Coast Claims Facility 
On June 16, 2010, following a meeting between BP officials and President Obama, BP 
agreed to create a fund to compensate victims of the Spill.  BP pledged to contribute a total of $20 
billion to the fund over a 40-month period, and further agreed to set aside $20 billion in U.S. assets 
                                                 
1 In September, 2010, Retired Coast Guard Admiral Thad Allen, appointed by the Obama administration to 
coordinate efforts to stop the leak, deemed the well “effectively dead.”  See, e.g., Henry Fountain, U.S. Says BP Well is 
Finally ‘Dead,’ N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2010, at A14.  
2  See. e.g., Jane Lubchenco, et al., BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Budget: What Happened to the 0il?,  
http://www.noaanews.noaa.gov/stories2010/PDFs/OilBudget_description_%2083final.pdf (last visited November 16, 
2010). 
3 By comparison, it is estimated that between 11 and 32 million gallons of oil were released in the Exxon Valdez 
disaster.  The Exxon Valdez spill involved a heavier form of oil than did the Deepwater Horizon spill, which might have 
implications for the harm caused by the respective spills, and the relative difficulty and expense of removal efforts.  5 
 
to ensure the availability of adequate funds.
4  BP further indicated that the funds would be disbursed 
through a claims facility now known as the Gulf Coast Claims Facility (“GCCF”).   
The GCCF is described by BP as “an independent claims facility for submission and 
resolution of claims of Individuals and Businesses for costs and damages incurred as a result of the 
oil discharges due to the Deepwater Horizon incident on April 20, 2010.”
5  BP has designated 
Kenneth R. Feinberg, Esq. to act as the Claims Administrator for the fund.  According to BP, Mr. 
Feinberg acts independently of BP and is fully responsible for the administration and disbursement 
of funds via the GCCF.
6   
Claims filed with the GCCF are not claims that seek to establish BP’s liability under federal or 
state law.  The validity of these claims will instead be determined in accordance with the rules and 
procedures specified by the Claims Administrator.  Those who file claims with the GCCF are 
permitted separately to initiate or continue legal actions.  However, in order to obtain a final 
payment of GCCF funds, a claimant will be required by GCCF to waive any legal right she might 
have against BP for harms suffered in connection with the Spill.  Under the rules thus far specified 
by the Claims Administrator, eligible claimants include: “Individuals and Businesses that have 
incurred damages as a result of the Spill for Removal and Clean Up Costs, Damage to Real or 
Personal Property, Lost Earnings or Profits, Loss of Subsistence Use of Natural Resources, or 
Physical Injury or Death.”
7  
 
                                                 
4 See Jonathan Weisman & Guy Chazan, BP Agrees to $20 Billion Fund, WALL STREET JOURNAL, Jun. 17, 2010, at A1; 
Press Release, BP, BP Forms Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill Escrow Trust (Aug. 9, 2010), available at 
http://www.bp.com/genericarticle.do?categoryId=2012968&contentId=7064316 (last visited Nov. 10, 2010). 
5 Gulf Coast Claims Facility, http://www.gulfcoastclaimsfacility.com/faq (last visited Nov. 10, 2010). 
6 Id.  
7 Id. 6 
 
II.  SCOPE OF ANALYSIS 
The analysis that follows is not provided to establish the terms on which GCCF funds ought 
to be distributed.  The GCCF was voluntarily established by BP and the criteria for distribution of 
its funds will be determined by the Claims Administrator.  This report is instead intended to provide 
an assessment of the legal liability BP and/or its subsidiaries can be expected to face if certain claims 
against it are pursued in courts of law – specifically, claims seeking compensation for economic loss 
not predicated on personal injury or physical damage to the claimant’s property.  As explained 
below, although federal and state law provide substantial guidance on the resolution of such claims, 
courts have not fully specified the rules that would apply to such claims.  As a result, this analysis – 
like any analysis of partially open legal questions – requires judgments that are to some degree 
debatable.  The focus will be on the federal Oil Pollution Act, which was enacted by Congress in 
part to provide relief to persons suffering certain forms of economic harm as a result of the release 
of oil into navigable waters.  In addition, liability for economic losses under the laws of Gulf states 
will be discussed briefly. 
 
III.    LIABILITY FOR ECONOMIC LOSS UNDER THE OIL POLLUTION ACT 
On August 18, 1990, President George H.W. Bush signed into law the Oil Pollution Act of 
1990 (“OPA” or “Act”).
8  The Act aims both to reduce the incidence of oil spills and to provide for 
remediation and compensation for spills that do occur.    
The immediate impetus for the adoption of OPA was the March, 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill 
in Prince William Sound, Alaska.  However, Congress had for the preceding fifteen years been 
attempting to fashion a law for oil spills to replace the patchwork regulation provided by other 
                                                 
8 33 U.S.C. §2701, et seq.  (2004). 7 
 
federal laws, including the Clean Water Act (“CWA”)
9 and the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization 
Act (“TAPAA”),
10 and to ensure that federal oil pollution control law would mesh appropriately 
with other environmental laws, especially the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act (“CERCLA”),
11 as well as state laws.  Prior to 1990, these efforts 
had failed to produce enacted legislation, in part because of disputes within Congress as to whether 
the envisioned law would coexist with state oil pollution laws or supersede them. 
 
A.  OPA’s Liability Provisions 
1.  Liability Trigger 
OPA’s basic liability scheme is set out in Section 1002(a) of the statute,  codified at 33 U.S.C. 
§ 2702(a).  It is then refined in subsequent sections.  In relevant part, Section 2702(a) reads as 
follows: 
[E]ach responsible party for … a facility from which oil is discharged, or which 
poses the substantial threat of a discharge of oil, into or upon the navigable waters or 
adjoining shorelines … is liable for the removal costs and damages specified in 
[Section 2702(b)] that result from such incident.
12 
  
The term “responsible party” includes any lessee or permittee of an area in which an “offshore 
facility” is located.
13  “Offshore facility” is defined to include any “facility”
14 that is “located in, on, 
or under any of the navigable waters of the United States.”
15  Oil leaking from a facility counts as oil 
                                                 
9  Federal Water Pollution Control Act (commonly known as the Clean Water Act), codified as amended at 33 
U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2000). 
10 Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act of 1973, codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1651–1656 (2000). 
11 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 and Superfund Amendments 
and Reauthorization Act of 1986, codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675 (2002). 
12 33 U.S.C. § 2702(a). 
13 Id. § 2701(32)(C).   
14 “Facility” includes “any structure … equipment, or device (other than a vessel) which is used for … exploring for, 
drilling for, producing, storing, handling, transferring, processing, or transporting oil.”  Id. § 2701(9).   
15 Id. § 2701(22). 8 
 
being “discharged” under the statute.
16  The phrase “navigable waters” is defined as “waters of the 
United States, including the territorial sea.”
17    
Responsible-party liability for recoverable costs and damages that result from an oil 
discharge is strict – an eligible claimant can obtain compensation without having to prove that the 
discharge resulted from carelessness or other wrongdoing on the part of the responsible party or its 
employees.
18  However, liability is not absolute: OPA recognizes a narrow set of defenses.
19  A 
responsible party can avoid liability altogether by proving that the discharge of oil and resulting 
damages or removal costs were “caused solely by” an act of God, an act of war, or an act or 
omission of certain third parties.
20  OPA also bars particular claims that would otherwise be valid if 
the incident giving rise to the claim “is caused by the gross negligence or willful misconduct of the 
claimant.”
21 
 
2.  Recoverable Costs and Damages 
As noted above, a party that is responsible for a spill under OPA section 2702(a) is required 
to compensate fully certain removal costs and damages incurred as a result of the spill.
22  These costs and 
damages are specified in Section 2702(b).  Removal costs – the costs of clean-up – are recoverable 
by governmental entities, and by any person who takes actions consistent with the National 
Contingency Plan.  Section 2702(b)(2) sets out six types of damages that are recoverable.  Three can 
only be recovered by, or on behalf of, governmental entities: natural resources damages, lost tax and 
                                                 
16 Id. § 2701(7). 
17 Id. § 2701(21).   
18 Rice v. Harkin Exploration Co., 250 F.3d 264, 266 (5th Cir. 2001). 
19 All of the following complete defenses are lost if the responsible party does not comply with certain reporting 
requirements.  33 U.S.C. § 2703(c). 
20 Id. § 2703(a).  Even if a “third party” is the sole cause of a discharge and resulting costs and damages, the 
responsible party is not spared from liability if the third party was acting pursuant to a contractual relationship with the 
responsible party.  Moreover, even when a fully independent third party is the sole cause of a discharge and resulting 
costs and damages, the responsible party cannot escape liability unless it proves that it exercised due care to prevent a 
release of oil, and took precautions against foreseeable acts of third parties.  Id. § 2703(a)(3). 
21 Id. § 2703(b).   
22 OPA does not provide for punitive damages.   9 
 
other revenues traceable to damage to real or personal property, and costs associated with the 
provision of public services during or after removal activities.
23  The remaining three subsections of 
Section 2702(b)(2) set out distinct types of recoverable damages and identify different classes of 
claimants who may recover them, as follows: 
•  Under Section 2702(b)(2)(B) “injury to, or economic losses resulting from 
destruction of, real or personal property” is recoverable by a claimant who “owns or 
leases that property.”
24  
  
•  Under Section 2702(b)(2)(C) a person who uses natural resources for subsistence 
may recover for damage to, or loss or destruction of, those natural resources.
25 
 
•  Under Section 2702(b)(2)(E) “[d]amages equal to the loss of profits or impairment of 
earning capacity due to the injury, destruction, or loss of real property, personal 
property, or natural resources” are recoverable by “any claimant.”
26 
 
 
  3.  Scope of Liability 
 
OPA places caps on responsible party liability, though the caps can be forfeited, as explained 
below.  For offshore facilities other than deepwater ports, the cap is $75 million per responsible 
party per incident.
27  Any damages for which the responsible party is responsible, as well as removal 
costs incurred by the responsible party itself, count toward the cap.  Removal costs incurred by 
government actors do not.
28   Under Section 2704(c)(1), the cap does not apply 
if the incident was proximately caused by—  
(A) gross negligence or willful misconduct of, or 
(B) the violation of an applicable Federal safety, construction, or operating 
regulation by, 
the responsible party, an agent or employee of the responsible party, or a person 
acting pursuant to a contractual relationship with the responsible party ….
29 
 
                                                 
23 Id. § 2702(b)(2)(A), (D), (F). 
24 Id. § 2702(b)(2)(B). 
25 Id. § 2702(b)(2)(C). 
26 Id. § 2702(b)(2)(E).   
27 Id. § 2704(a)(3).   
28 Id. § 2704(a), (c)(3). 
29 Id. § 2704(c)(1).   10 
 
  For all incidents to which a damages cap applies, there is a possibility, depending on the 
amount of harm associated with the relevant incident, that total recoverable damages will exceed 
the cap.  Likewise, there is also the possibility that a responsible party will not have sufficient assets 
to cover all removal costs and compensate all claimants to whom it is liable for damages.  In either 
case, a person with a valid claim can obtain reimbursement from the federal Oil Spill Liability Trust 
Fund (“the Fund”).
30  OPA specifies that the Fund can pay out up to a maximum of $1 billion per 
incident, and is to be financed primarily by taxes on crude oil received at U.S. refineries, and on 
petroleum products imported into, consumed in, or warehoused in the United States.
31  OPA sets 
out procedures that claimants must follow to recover from the Fund, and also specifies that, with 
certain exceptions, moneys in the fund will be available only as provided for in the annual 
appropriations acts of Congress.
32  
 
  4.  Summary of Key Features of OPA’s Liability Scheme 
•  A responsible party is liable under OPA for removal costs and certain types of damages 
that “result from” an actual or threatened discharge of oil into navigable waters or onto adjoining 
shorelines without regard to whether the responsible party was at fault for the discharge.  
•  Among the types of damages resulting from a discharge recoverable under OPA are lost 
profits or impaired earning capacity “due to” damage, destruction, or loss of property or natural 
resources.  
                                                 
30 Id. § 2712(a)(4). 
31 26 U.S.C. § 9509(c)(2) (1990).  The Fund can be used to cover both removal costs and to provide compensation 
for damages, although no more than $500 million per incident can be paid out for natural resources damages.  Id. § 
9509(c)(2)(A)(ii).  OPA defines “incident” as “any occurrence or series of occurrences having the same origin, involving 
one or more vessels, facilities, or any combination thereof, resulting in the discharge or substantial threat of discharge of 
oil.” 33 U.S.C. § 2701(14).  
32 33 U.S.C. § 2713(b); Id. § 2752(a). In the event that a spill generates removal costs and damages that exceed any 
limits set by OPA for responsible party liability, as well as the per-incident $1 billion cap on the fund, uncompensated 
claims can in principle be pursued under state law, though – as discussed below – state laws tend to define spill-related 
liability more narrowly than OPA, and thus may not permit recovery by claimants who might have recovered under 
OPA had the caps not been reached. 11 
 
•  A responsible party can avoid liability altogether only by showing that the discharge and 
resulting costs and damages were “caused solely by” an act of God, an act of war, or certain 
independent third party acts.  It can also avoid liability to a particular claimant if the incident that 
generated the discharge is “caused by” the gross negligence or willful misconduct of the claimant.   
•  For certain offshore facilities, the total cost to a responsible party of its liability for 
damages and its own removal costs is subject to an aggregate cap of $75 million.  However, this and 
other statutory caps are lifted if the incident that generates the discharge is “proximately caused by” 
gross negligence or willful misconduct by the responsible party and its agents, employees, and those 
acting pursuant to a contractual relationship with it, or by the violation of an applicable Federal 
safety, construction, or operating regulation. 
 
B.  OPA Liability for Economic Loss: The “Due To” Requirement 
 
This report will assume for purposes of analysis that the Spill falls within Section 2702(a)’s 
definition of a discharge, such that BP and/or one or more of its subsidiary companies are subject to 
liability under the terms of that section.
33   The question to be addressed is the scope of that liability.   
 
1.  Distinguishing Economic Loss Parasitic on Harm to One’s Own Property  
Section 2702(b)(2)(B) makes clear that owners and lessees of property can recover damages 
from a responsible party for physical injury to, or physical destruction of, their property.  For 
example, the owner of a beachfront hotel whose beach is actually contaminated with oil can recover 
compensation for the harm to his property, and can also recover economic losses associated with 
that harm – such as lost revenues resulting from potential customers cancelling reservations or 
                                                 
33 BP Exploration and Production, Inc., a BP subsidiary, has accepted the U.S. Coast Guard’s designation of it as a 
responsible party with respect to the Spill.  http://www.uscg.mil/foia/docs/DWH/2094.pdf (last visited, Nov. 10, 
2010).  It is further assumed that BP and/or any subsidiaries will not be able to take advantage of any complete defense 
to liability recognized by the statute.   12 
 
deciding not to stay at the hotel because of the polluted beach.  Likewise, if oil from a discharge 
were to gum up the engines of a boat that has been leased by a commercial fisherman, that 
fisherman stands to recover damages including lost profits caused by the damage to the boat.
34   
 
2.  The Universe of Potential Pure Economic Loss Claimants 
Section 2702(b)(2)(E) makes equally clear that Congress also contemplated recovery by some 
persons who, because of a release of oil, suffer lost profits or impaired earning capacity but neither 
own nor lease property that has been damaged or lost.  The question is who among this class of persons is 
entitled to recover.  On this question, it will be helpful to imagine a range of hypothetical claimants who 
might claim lost profits or earning capacity based on a large discharge of oil in the Gulf region.  For 
purposes of these hypothetical claims, the responsible party is a fictitious entity named “Oil Co.,” 
which is assumed to be a U.S. corporation. 
 
•  C is a commercial fisherman who relies for his business on fisheries in the Gulf of 
Mexico.  C claims that oil from a spill for which Oil Co. is responsible has polluted 
the waters in which he fishes, and that he has been and will be unable to fish for a 
period of time, resulting in lost profits.  
 
•  H owns and operates a beachfront hotel in the Gulf area.  Oil from the Oil Co. spill 
has not reached the beachfront that is owned by H and reserved for use by guests at 
H’s hotel.  However, oil has been found in the immediate vicinity of H’s hotel, 
including in waters that H’s guests frequently use, and neighboring beaches that H’s 
guests routinely visit.  H claims to have suffered a loss of business because tourists, 
in light of the effects of the spill on the immediate area in which his hotel is situated, 
have decided to vacation elsewhere. 
 
•  E is an employee at H’s hotel.  Because the hotel has lost business, its managers have 
reduced staff hours by 25%, as a result of which E has suffered and will suffer a 25% 
reduction in his wages for a certain period.  
                                                 
34 See South Port Marine, LLC v. Gulf Oil Ltd. P’ship, 234 F.3d 58, 66-67 (1st Cir. 2000) (reinstating jury award of 
damages for lost profits resulting from damage to plaintiff’s property caused by defendant’s release of oil into harbor); In 
re Alex C Corp., Nos. 01-12184, 01-12186, 00-12500, 2003 WL 203078, at *5 (D. Mass. Jan. 30, 2003) (allowing recovery 
for economic loss parasitic on damage to claimant’s boats caused by spill). 13 
 
•  B owns a barge that is used to haul equipment and supplies up and down a small 
navigable river that runs to the Gulf.  Oil from the spill reaches the river, threatening 
migratory birds that live there.  Authorities close the river to boat traffic for three 
weeks to permit clean-up.  B is unable to operate his barge during this time and seeks 
recovery of profits he would have made.  
 
•  R operates a dockside restaurant located in a Gulf seaport.  Its regular customers are 
dockworkers, fishermen, and others whose jobs are connected with maritime 
commerce.  R claims that, because of the spill, the restaurant has lost profits because 
many of the restaurant’s regular customers have not been frequenting it. 
 
•  A is a real estate agent whose listings are made up primarily of beachfront properties 
in an area of the Gulf that has been contaminated by the spill.  She claims that the 
market for property sales and rentals has collapsed because of the spill, depriving her 
of commissions she otherwise would have made. 
 
•  W is a woodworker who owns a small furniture store located three miles inland in a 
town that relies on beach tourism as a major source of revenue.  W claims that, 
because some of the town’s beaches have been polluted by the spill, orders for his 
furniture are down and that he has lost profits as a result. 
 
•  O owns a beachfront inn located on the Gulf.  No oil from the spill has come within 
100 miles of the waters or the stretch of coastline on which the inn sits, and, at that 
location, the spill has had no other discernable adverse physical effects (such as 
noxious odors).  However, given prevailing currents and winds, government officials 
and scientists have concluded that oil might reach those waters and beaches within a 
month.  O claims to have suffered cancelled reservations and lost profits because of 
the credible threat of oil pollution to the water and beaches adjacent to the inn. 
 
•  F owns and operates a fireworks store that is situated along the main interstate 
highway that leads to a set of Gulf beaches, 150 miles north of those beaches.  F 
relies on tourists traveling to and from the beaches for much of his business.  F 
claims to have lost profits because of reduced tourist traffic resulting from the Oil 
Co. spill. 
 
•  T runs a tour boat that takes passengers along scenic Gulf shoreline.  No oil from 
the spill has come, or threatened to come, within 400 miles of the area in which T’s 
tours takes place.  T claims that, because of popular misimpressions about the scope 
of the spill, the spill has depressed tourism in the entire Gulf region, in turn causing 
T to lose business and profits. 
 
•  D owns an amusement park in a land-locked portion of central Florida. Many of D’s 
patrons are families that combine a trip to D’s park with a beach vacation on 
Florida’s Atlantic Coast, which was never at risk of suffering pollution because of the 
spill.  D claims that consumer unease about traveling to Florida because of the spill 
has caused D to suffer lost profits. 14 
 
•  N owns and operates a resort in Nevada.  Each year for the past decade, an 
association of Gulf-area fishermen has held its annual meeting at N’s facility.  N 
claims that the spill’s economic effects have caused the association to cancel its plans 
to hold their convention at N’s facility, in turn causing N lost profits. 
 
•  M, a company incorporated and operated in Hartford, Connecticut imports 
snorkeling equipment manufactured in China.  M claims that, because of the spill, 
snorkeling equipment sales are down, resulting in lost profits. 
 
•  S runs a seafood restaurant in Phoenix, Arizona.  Although the seafood it serves is 
not from the Gulf, S claims that it has lost profits because of general consumer fears 
about contaminated seafood caused by the spill. 
 
•  G owns a gas station in Boise, Idaho that sells Oil Co.-brand gasoline.  Although G 
owns and operates the station as an independent franchise, his station becomes the 
target of a boycott by a local environmental group demanding greater corporate 
accountability.  G claims lost income resulting from the boycott.   
 
•  L runs a catering company based in New York City, which is also the location of Oil 
Co.’s U.S. headquarters.  L claims that a substantial portion of her profits had 
previously come from catering events at Oil Co. headquarters, but that she has lost 
revenues because Oil Co. has substantially cut back on catered events in the 
aftermath of the spill. 
 
Given the interdependent nature of modern economies, this list of imagined claimants could 
easily be extended, and dramatically so.  This is because each claimant who suffers an economic 
setback because of a spill will probably pass on a portion of that setback to other persons and 
entities dependent on that claimant for business.  For example, if commercial fishermen suffer lost 
profits because of a spill that renders them unable to fish in Gulf waters, retail stores at which those 
fishermen regularly shop can expect to experience a loss of revenue.  In turn, this might cause those 
stores to make smaller purchases from wholesalers.  In turn, this might cause wholesalers to cut 
employee hours or wages.  The key question is how far OPA means for liability to extend along this 
sort of economic chain reaction.     
 15 
 
3.  Proof of Economic Loss and Actual Causation 
 
To recover under OPA, each of the foregoing imagined claimants would have to offer 
adequate proof that she actually suffered lost profits or diminished earning capacity (proof of 
economic loss) and that this loss resulted from the spill (proof of a causal connection between the 
spill and the economic loss).  These are distinct requirements.  Even a claimant with compelling 
documentation of economic loss still needs to prove that she probably would not have experienced 
that loss had the spill not occurred.  In other words, she must show that the loss was more likely to 
have been caused by the oil spill than by other possible causes such as an economic recession, or, in 
the case of a beachfront resort, an algal bloom that happened to occur in nearby waters, was 
unrelated to the spill, and on its own may have deterred vacationers from vacationing there.   
Were each of the imagined claimants to pursue their claims in court, it is realistic to expect 
that some would have sufficient evidence of actual loss and actual causation, whereas others would 
not.  However, there is no particular reason to think that claimants more closely connected to the 
spill in time and space will, as a class, be in a better position to offer such evidence, or that claimants 
farther removed from the spill will be less well-positioned to offer such evidence.  The requirements 
of proof of economic loss and proof of causation do not draw categorical lines between classes of 
claimants.  They set standards of proof that any particular claimant may or may not be able to meet.  
For example, even though it is intuitive to think of R, the local restaurant owner, as someone who 
was more immediately harmed by the spill than L, the New York City caterer, it is entirely possible 
that L will have better documentation of lost profits and their connection to the hypothesized Oil 
Co. spill than R.   
 16 
 
4.  Section 2702(b)(2)(E)’s “Due To” Clause 
With respect to liability for economic loss that does not arise out of damage to property or 
resources that the claimant herself owns or leases, the key issue is whether OPA contains an 
additional requirement beyond: (1) proof of responsibility for a discharge under Section 2702(a); (2) 
proof of actual economic loss; and (3) proof of actual causation, or whether these are the only 
requirements.  This is an issue of statutory interpretation.  The search for an answer must therefore 
begin with the plain terms of the statute.
35  In particular, the focus must be on the intersection of 
Section 2702(a) – OPA’s liability trigger – and Section 2702(b)(2)(E) – the provision that specifies 
when a triggering event will generate liability for lost profits or impaired earning capacity.   
As noted above, Section 2702(a) imposes liability for types of damages that “result from” a 
discharge that falls within the terms of that section, albeit only those types of damages identified in 
Section 2702(b).  The latter in turn identifies, as one type of recoverable damages, “[d]amages equal 
to the loss of profits or impairment of earning capacity due to the injury, destruction, or loss of real 
property, personal property, or natural resources ….”  These kinds of damages can be recovered by 
“any claimant” – that is, irrespective of whether the person seeking recovery owns the property or 
resources that have been damaged or lost.   
By its plain terms, OPA limits the universe of valid claims for lost profits and impaired 
earning capacity to those “due to” the injury, loss or destruction of property or resources.  To be 
sure, OPA decouples the right to bring a claim for lost profits or impaired earning capacity from an 
ownership or lease interest in the property or resources that are damaged or lost.  Non-owners have 
standing to bring claims under Section 2702(b)(2)(E) – they are eligible to recover.  But OPA does 
not  decouple the right to bring a claim for lost profits or impaired earning capacity from the 
                                                 
35 See Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 2149, 2156 (2010) (“[W]e begin by analyzing the statutory 
language, ‘assum[ing] that the ordinary meaning of that language accurately expresses the legislative purpose.’”) (second 
alteration in original) (quoting Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2350 (2009)). 
 17 
 
occurrence of damage to, or loss of, property or natural resources.  Quite the opposite, Section 
2702(b)(2)(E)’s “due to” clause imposes a second-layer causation requirement on top of the initial 
“result from” requirement set by Section 2702(a).  A claimant relying on these sections must prove 
damage to, or loss of, property or natural resources that “result[s] from” a discharge,
36 and lost 
profits or impaired earning capacity “due to” that damage or loss. 
To appreciate the significance of Section 2702(b)(2)(E)’s “due to” clause, one need only 
consider the reach of that section had the clause been omitted.  If Congress had sought to impose 
liability for all provable economic loss resulting from a discharge, it could quite easily have written 
Section 2702(b)(2)(E) to read as follows: “damages equal to the loss of profits or impairment of 
earning capacity are recoverable by any claimant.”  This hypothetical provision, when read in 
conjunction with the “result from” language of Section 2702(a), would require only proof of 
responsibility for an actual (or threatened) discharge, economic loss, and actual causation.  As such, 
it would entail liability for all lost profits and impaired earning capacity resulting from a discharge or 
                                                 
36 Section 2702(a)’s “result from” language thus precludes recovery for economic losses connected to property or 
resource damage where that damage happens coincidentally to a discharge of oil.  For example, suppose a vessel carrying 
oil collides with a fishing boat, spilling a small amount of oil, but also causing structural damage to the fishing boat.  The 
damage requires the boat to be taken in for repairs, thereby inflicting economic losses on the crew of the boat, which 
remains idle during the repair period.  The economic losses suffered by the crew might well be “due to” the physical 
damage to the fishing boat, but that damage did not “result from” the discharge of oil – the fishing boat would have 
required repair even if there had been no discharge.  Instead, the damage to property resulted from the collision, which 
collision only coincidentally happened to generate a discharge.    
At least one federal court decision has provided an interpretation of Section 2702(a)’s “result from” language.  In 
Gatlin Oil Co. v. United States, 169 F.3d 207 (4th Cir. 1999), the judges disagreed among themselves as to whether the 
destruction of property by a fire fueled by a spill could be deemed to have resulted from a discharge or threatened 
discharge of oil.  The majority reasoned, somewhat obscurely, that, because the fire itself did not cause a discharge or 
threatened discharge, the property damage caused by the fire could not be deemed to have resulted from a discharge.  Id. 
at 212.  A dissenting judge reasoned that the damage should be deemed to have resulted from the spill because the spill 
was a necessary condition for the fire that caused the damage.  Id. at 214-15 (Niemeyer, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part).  
The House Bill that eventually gave rise to OPA would have limited Section 2702(a)’s “result from” language by 
adding the adjective “directly.”  H.R. 1465, 101st CONG. § 102(a)(1) (1989).  That proposed modifier, obviously, was 
omitted from the final bill.  Whatever significance this omission might have for the precise contours of Section 2702(a)’s 
“result from” requirement, it does not entail that Congress intended no limits on liability for economic loss beyond 
proof of actual loss and actual causation.  This is because the “due to” clause of Section 2702(b)(2)(E) stands separate 
and apart from 2702(a)’s “result from” clause and, as such, explicitly states an independent limitation on such liability. 18 
 
threatened discharge.  But of course this is not what Section 2702(b)(2)(E) says.
37  To read OPA to 
extend to any and all lost profits and impaired earning capacity caused by a discharge in violation of 
Section 2702(a) would be to ignore the “due to” clause – to treat it as mere surplusage.  It is a 
fundamental tenet of statutory construction that statutory terms are presumed not to be 
superfluous.
38    
The “due to” clause thus sets an additional requirement for recovery for economic loss 
under OPA.  Any reading of the statute that does not recognize this requirement disregards its plain 
text.  However, at least in the abstract, the requirement set by the “due to” clause is susceptible to 
different interpretations.  For example, the clause, taken on its own, could conceivably be read to set 
a threshold for economic loss liability that treats the fact of any harm to any property or natural 
resources as a trigger for the recovery of economic losses by any claimant.  On this interpretation, 
the statute, for purposes of claims for economic loss, would draw a sharp distinction between two 
scenarios: (1) discharges that cause no property or resource damage or loss whatsoever, yet still 
cause lost profits or impaired earnings capacity, and (2) discharges that cause some property or 
resource damage or loss, as well as lost profits or impaired earnings capacity.  The “due to” clause, 
according to this reading of OPA, would specify that recovery for economic losses is unavailable to 
anyone who suffers such losses as a result of a spill that is physically harmless, but that recovery is 
available to anyone who suffers any sort of economic loss because of a spill that is physical harmful:  
the fact of some property or resource damage would be treated as an on-off switch that, once flipped, 
                                                 
37 In fact, the first two damages provisions of Section 2702(b) authorize claims that are defined without reference to 
a second layer of causation analysis, which strongly suggests that the insertion of Section 2702(b)(2)(E)’s “due to” 
requirement was a considered decision.  See 33 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(2)(A), (B) (authorizing recovery for natural resources 
damages and real or personal property damages, respectively, without requiring any connection to a discharge beyond 
the “result from” requirement of Section 2702(a)).    
38 See Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253 (1992).  Note that this reading of OPA does not purport to 
find buried within the statute an implicit, unstated limitation on liability for economic loss.  Rather, it identifies the “due 
to” clause as an expressly stated limitation on such liability.       19 
 
allows all claims for economic loss, irrespective of the nature of the linkage between those claims 
and the property or resource damage that has occurred.  
Although intelligible in the abstract, this rendering of the “due to” clause is unsound.  OPA 
arguably does not even permit a distinction between discharges that do not result in any damage to, 
or loss of, property or natural resources, and discharges that result in some harm or loss to property 
or resources.  The statute defines “natural resources” to include “land” and “water” generically.
39  
Given that, under Section 2702(a), liability for a discharge of oil can only be incurred when there is a 
release of oil “into or upon … navigable waters, or adjoining shorelines,” it might follow that every 
discharge actionable under OPA is by definition a discharge that results in at least some natural 
resources damage or loss.  On this reading, there is no such thing, under OPA, as a spill that fails to 
cause damage to, or loss of, some property or natural resources.   
Even if there could in theory be a harmless-to-property-and-resources spill under OPA, it 
would be exceedingly odd to suppose that Congress meant to build the statute’s liability provisions 
for economic loss around the theoretical but vanishingly small probability of a spill that causes 
economic loss while causing no harm to, or loss of, property or resources.  Nothing in the language 
or structure of Section 2702(b) suggests a recognition of this esoteric distinction.  Quite the 
opposite, each of the section’s six separate damages provisions purport to apply to any type of 
discharge that violates Section 2702(a).  The “due to” clause of Section 2702(b)(2)(E) cannot and 
should not be understood as drawing, obliquely, a practically insignificant distinction between 
discharges that cause some property or resource damages and those that cause none whatsoever.
40    
                                                 
39 33 U.S.C. § 2701(20).   
40 A variant on this reading of OPA would link the “due to” clause to Section 2702(a)’s recognition of liability for 
threatened discharges and actual discharges. See id. § 2702(a) (imposing liability on parties responsible for a facility “which 
poses the substantial threat of a discharge of oil” into navigable waters).  On this reading, the “due to” clause would 
function to deny recovery of economic losses only in those cases where the OPA violation consists of a threatened 
discharge that never materializes, and to allow recovery for all such losses for all cases in which there has been an actual 
discharge.  Again, nothing in the language or structure of Section 2702(b) suggests that Congress meant to set actual 
discharge (as opposed to threatened discharge) as a threshold for recovery of lost profits.  As noted in the text, the 20 
 
By contrast, it is entirely natural to read Section 2702(b)(2)(E)’s “due to” clause as requiring 
as a condition of recovery for lost profits or impaired earning capacity a nexus beyond bare 
causation between the lost profits or impaired earning capacity (on the one hand) and the damage 
to, or loss of, property or natural resources (on the other).  No interpretive gymnastics are required.  
Rather, one need only treat the phrase “due to” as refining the actual causation requirement already 
specified by the “result from” language of Section 2702(a).   
Such a reading of OPA’s economic loss provisions is perfectly consonant with judicial 
readings of highly comparable statutes.  Indeed, even when confronted with statutory liability 
provisions that use variants on the phrase “result from” as a stand-alone causation requirement, courts 
have read into that phrase both an actual causation requirement and a proximate cause limitation – 
the latter excluding liability for certain kinds of ‘remote’ consequences.
41  They have done so because 
it has long been commonplace for lawyers and courts to use these sorts of phrases to encompass 
notions of both actual and proximate cause.
42   
                                                                                                                                                             
various damages provisions of Section 2702(b) are written generically to cover all violations of Section 2702(a), 
regardless of whether they involve a threatened or actual discharge.  If Congress meant for Section 2702(b)(2)(E) – alone 
among Section 2702(b)’s six damages provisions – to incorporate a distinction between threatened and actual discharges, 
it easily could have, and presumably would have, explicitly limited its applicability to cases of actual discharges.  Denying 
recovery for economic losses resulting from threatened discharges would also exclude recovery for lost profits in 
situations in which Congress seems to have contemplated recovery.  For example, suppose a threatened discharge that 
does not materialize were to induce authorities to close an area to commercial fishing for a month.  It seems likely that 
OPA is intended to authorize recovery by any adversely affected fishermen.  Their lost profits, after all, would be “due 
to” a (temporary) “loss” of “natural resources” that has “result[ed] from” a “substantial threat of discharge of oil” into 
navigable waters.    
41 In legal usage, the modifier “proximate” in the phrase “proximate cause” has a specialized meaning that takes 
account of, but is not exhausted by, notions of physical or temporal distance.  Under the heading of “proximate cause,” 
one inquires whether a legally wrongful act that has actually caused harm to another has caused it in a haphazard, 
unexpected, or attenuated manner, such that the actor should be relieved of responsibility for the harm notwithstanding 
that his act caused it.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 29 (2010) 
(advocating use of the phrase “scope of liability” in place of the traditional phrase “proximate cause” to emphasize that 
negligence law contains a separate filter for liability beyond actual causation, by which liability is excluded for harms that 
are so haphazardly caused as to not count as the realization of one of the risks that rendered the actor’s conduct 
careless).  The mere fact that a careless act happens to cause harm hundreds of miles away from the place of the act, or 
years after the act takes place, does not automatically entail the conclusion that the actor should not be held responsible.  
Physical and temporal distance are relevant to this determination, but are not necessarily dispositive.      
42 See United States v. Wells, 519 U.S. 482, 491 (1997) (Congress is presumed to incorporate the common-law 
meaning of familiar legal terms).  It is true that another OPA provision – Section 2704(c)(1) – employs the phrase 
“proximately caused” in specifying the limited circumstances in which a responsible party can disclaim liability for 
damages.  In some contexts, the fact that a statute uses the modifier “proximately” in one provision dealing with liability 21 
 
CERCLA – the federal “Superfund” law – is a statute that, like OPA, imposes liability for 
harms caused by the release of hazardous materials.  Moreover, it served as one of the models for 
OPA’s strict-liability approach to oil spills.
43  Under CERCLA a responsible party is strictly liable 
for, among other things, “damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources … 
resulting from [a release of hazardous substances].”  Interpreting CERCLA’s “resulting from” 
language, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit endorsed as entirely reasonable the U.S. Interior 
Department’s interpretation of that phrase as incorporating requirements of both actual and 
proximate cause,
44 thereby upholding a regulation requiring claimants who sought recovery for 
natural resource damage to prove not only that a release of hazardous materials was an actual cause 
of the damage, but also that the damage was not “predominantly caused” by other factors.
45 
Even more telling are judicial interpretations of TAPAA, another statutory predecessor of 
OPA.  TAPAA is directly concerned with liability for oil spills, and is in important respects written 
more broadly than OPA.  A party that is responsible for the discharge of oil from a vessel carrying 
oil from the Trans-Alaska pipeline is subject to liability for “all damages … sustained by any person or 
entity … as the result of discharge of oil from such vessel.”
46  Notwithstanding the facial breadth of 
this language, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that Congress did not thereby “intend 
                                                                                                                                                             
for harms and does not use it in another nearby clause dealing with liability for harms might give rise to the inference 
that Congress did not intend for the latter to be limited by a notion of proximity.  See Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 
16, 23 (1983) (noting the general presumption that Congress’s use of particular language in one statutory provision and 
its omission of that language from another provision is intentional).  However, as explained above, the interpretation of 
OPA provided here does not rest on finding in Section 2702(b)(2)(E) an implicit proximate cause limitation of a sort that 
might run afoul of the Russello inference of intentional exclusion.  Rather, it rests on the fact that OPA explicitly sets two 
distinct causation-related requirements for claims seeking recovery for economic loss: (1) harm to, or loss of, property or 
resources that results from a spill, and (2) economic loss due to that harm or loss.  The statute’s economic loss 
provisions are in this respect formulated in a fundamentally different manner than its provisions recognizing certain 
defenses to liability.  See City of Columbus v. Ours Garage & Wrecker Service, Inc., 536 U.S. 424, 435 (2002) (noting 
inapplicability of the Russello presumption where provisions in the same statute are distinctly formulated). 
43 See Russell V. Randle, The Oil Pollution Act of 1990: Its Provisions, Intent, and Effects, in OIL POLLUTION DESKBOOK 3, 
4 (Envtl. Law Reporter ed., 1991) (noting that OPA’s liability provisions were “modeled closely on those of CERCLA 
and of … the Clean Water Act”). 
44 Ohio v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 880 F.2d 432, 470-72 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 
45 Id. at 469; see also United States v. Montrose Chem. Corp. of Cal., No. 90-3122, 1991 WL 183147, at *1 (C.D. Cal. 
Mar. 29, 1991) (interpreting CERCLA’s “resulting from” language to require proof that the defendant’s release was a 
“sole or substantially contributing cause” of natural resource damages). 
46 43 U.S.C. § 1653(c)(1) (2000) (emphasis added). 22 
 
to abrogate all principles of proximate cause.”
47  Denying outright claims alleging that the Exxon 
Valdez spill had caused consumers to suffer economic losses in the form of higher gasoline prices, 
the Court interpreted TAPAA to be focused on: 
damages arising out of the physical effects of oil discharges.  The remote and 
derivative damages of the type claimed by plaintiffs here fall outside the zone of 
dangers against which Congress intended to protect when it passed TAPAA.
48  
 
The Court thus concluded that TAPAA’s “result of” language should instead be read to incorporate 
common law notions of proximate cause.
49  
The courts that rendered these decisions were interpreting statutory forbearers of OPA that 
impose liability on facially broader terms than does OPA.  Neither CERCLA nor TAPAA contains a 
second-layer causation requirement comparable to Section 2702(b)(2)(E)’s “due to” clause.
50  If 
                                                 
47 Benefiel v. Exxon Corp., 959 F.2d 805, 807 (9th Cir. 1992); see also Slaven v. BP America, Inc., 786 F. Supp. 853, 
858 (C.D. Cal. 1992) (while TAPAA was meant to eliminate admiralty law’s bright-line rule barring liability in cases 
alleging negligence causing only economic loss, “it is beyond dispute that in such a case the common law requirement of 
proximate cause is implicitly incorporated”).  In In re Glacier Bay, 746 F. Supp. 1379, 1388 (D. Alaska 1990) – decided 
prior to Benefiel and Slaven – the district judge asserted that “all provable damages sustained by any person as a result of 
[an oil spill in violation of TAPAA] are compensable ….”  746 F. Supp. at 1386.  However, this statement was not made 
in the face of suits seeking to recover damages for economic losses remotely related to an oil spill, but rather was issued 
in the early stages of litigation over claims brought by fishermen, fish processors, and other “shoreside businesses.”  Id. 
at 1382.  Accordingly, the statement is dictum.  In any event it was subsequently rejected by the Court of Appeals in 
Benefiel. 
48 959 F.2d at 807. 
49 Id.; see also Heppner v. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 665 F.2d 868, 873 (9th Cir. 1981) (finding TAPAA liability 
implicitly limited to harms relating to environmental damage resulting from pipeline-related activities).   
There is nothing anomalous about a scheme that combines strict (no-fault) liability with categorical limitations on 
that liability.  In fact, standard common law instances of strict liability have always incorporated such limitations.  For 
example, “abnormally dangerous activities” subject to strict liability do not give rise to claims for pure economic loss – 
such losses are excluded entirely from the ambit of strict liability.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR 
PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 20(a) (2010) (strict liability limited to instances of physical harm).  And even for 
physical harms resulting from abnormally dangerous activities, strict liability is limited by proximate cause principles.  Id. 
§ 29 cmt. l (observing that the Restatement’s “scope-of-liability limits” for claims of negligence also apply to common 
law strict liability claims; an actor is subject to liability only for those harms that amount to the realization of the risks of 
the activity that lead the law to regard the activity as appropriately subject to a rule of strict liability); see also Foster v. 
Preston Mill Co., 268 P.2d 645, 649 (Wash. 1954) (although a person engaged in blasting is ordinarily held strictly liable 
for physical harms actually caused by the blasting, no liability attaches where vibrations from blasting happened to 
unnerve minks living on plaintiff’s mink farm, in turn causing mother minks to destroy their offspring). 
50 To observe that courts have read some proximate cause limitations into CERCLA and TAPAA is not to conclude 
that the scope of liability under these statutes is identical to the scope of liability under OPA.  In particular, because 
TAPAA does not link recovery of economic loss to property or resource damage or loss, it may permit recovery in 
situations in which OPA would not.  See, e.g., In re Glacier Bay, 746 F. Supp. 1379, 1385-86 (D. Alaska 1990) (permitting 
claims by buyers, spotters, and processors of fish as falling within the scope of TAPAA’s “resulting from” language); In 
re Exxon Valdez, Nos. A89-095, A91-102, A91-103, A91-137, 1993 WL 787392, at *3 n.15 (D. Alaska Dec. 23, 1993) 
(noting that TAPAA contains a proximate cause limitation, but leaving undecided whether a taxidermist and a seller of 23 
 
these statutes are properly read to contain a proximate cause limitation, the implication that OPA 
includes a categorical limit on liability for economic loss is irresistible.  As we have seen, the only 
function that can possibly be ascribed to the “due to” clause is that of setting an additional filter on 
liability beyond actual cause – one that requires as a condition of recovery for lost profits or 
impaired earning capacity a more substantial connection between the happening of those losses and 
the happening of harm to property or resources. 
That OPA would contain some such requirement also makes sense in light of the overall 
design of the statute.  OPA aims to ensure that a wide array of persons who suffer various forms of 
injury obtain prompt and full compensation.  Yet the very fact that OPA has this aim undermines 
the notion that Congress could have intended it to extend to the entire universe of economic losses 
flowing from a discharge of oil into navigable waters.  OPA’s $1 billion trust fund was set up to 
ensure reimbursement of all damages claims contemplated by the statute that are not reimbursed by 
a responsible party: “the Fund backstops the [responsible party’s] limited liability and ensures that 
every valid claim will be paid in full.”
51  And it was and is expected to play this role even for 
“catastrophic” spills.
52   
Had Congress envisioned OPA to extend liability to all provable economic losses actually 
caused by a spill, it could not reasonably have supposed that the $1 billion fund, even coupled with 
responsible party payments, would be sufficient to provide adequate compensation to claimants.
53   
                                                                                                                                                             
refrigeration units doing business in the area of Prince William Sound can recover under TAPAA for loss of profits 
resulting from the Exxon Valdez spill). 
51 Bouchard Transp. Co. v. Updegraff, 147 F.3d 1344, 1350 (11th Cir. 1998) (emphasis added), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 
1140 (1999).   
52 Representative Jones, House sponsor of the bill that became OPA, described the law as “activat[ing] [the] trust 
fund, increas[ing] its size to $1 billion and increas[ing] its borrowing authority to handle catastrophic spills.”  136 CONG. 
REC. 22131, 22286 (1990); see also id. at  22292 (statement of Rep. Shumway) (“The most important provision in this bill 
is the $1 billion oilspill fund which will now be available to deal with even the largest of oil transportation accidents.”); 
id. at 22296 (statement of Rep. Sharp) (noting that the fund will “allow us to tackle big spills”).   
53 Deep-pocketed responsible parties may have sufficient assets to cover spill-related costs and damages that run 
into the billions.  However, it is important to recall that OPA contains liability caps, such as the $75 million cap on 
compensation for damages claims that applies to releases from offshore facilities not proximately caused by gross 
negligence or a statutory violation.  For this sort of spill, the $1 billion fund might well be the only source of 24 
 
Already in 1990 there was plenty of reason to believe that harms resulting from a major spill – if one 
were to include all of its adverse economic consequences – would vastly exceed that amount.  As 
Representative Nowak observed in 1989, some early estimates for the Exxon Valdez spill put the 
cost of removal by itself (without regard to damages claims) at more than $2 billion.
54  A  
contemporaneous front-page article in a prominent newspaper contemplating the potential 
economic impact of a major spill off the cost of Florida observed that such a spill could seriously 
curtail tourism, “which attracted 37 million people and $22 billion to Florida last year ….”
55  
Considered without regard to their connection to actual property or resource damage, the economic 
losses flowing from a major spill could have been expected to generate billions in lost profits for 
businesses in any state reliant on coastal resources to attract tourism, not to mention the additional 
billions in secondary and tertiary losses that would be suffered, nationwide, by other businesses 
dealing with those businesses.  In light of numbers such as these, it is simply not plausible to believe 
that Congress supposed that the liability provisions of OPA, backed by the Fund, would be 
sufficient to handle all the adverse economic ripple-effects flowing from a catastrophic spill.  Rather, 
legislators’ expectation of full compensation for valid claims must have rested on a more 
circumscribed conception of the type of claims that are eligible for compensation.    
 
                                                                                                                                                             
compensation for losses above the cap.  Even for instances of uncapped liability, the responsible party or parties could 
lack assets sufficient to cover the removal costs and compensable damages for which they are responsible, again 
resulting in the bulk of costs and damages being drawn from the trust fund.   Oil-carrying vessels are required by Coast 
Guard regulations to demonstrate that they have sufficient assets to cover the cost of a spill, but only up to the liability 
caps set by OPA.  33 C.F.R. § 138.30 (2010).  Department of Interior regulations likewise specify proof of financial 
responsibility as a condition of being permitted to operate facilities on the Outer Continental Shelf, but only up to a 
maximum of $150 million.  30 C.F.R. § 253.13 (2010). 
54 135 CONG. REC. 26904, 26939 (1989). 
55 Lisanne Renner, Oil Fears Flourish in Florida: Spill Could Strangle Ecology, Economy, ORLANDO SENTINEL (April 9, 
1989, at A1).   25 
 
C.   Scope of Liability Under Section 2702(b)(2)(E) 
Section 2702(b)(2)(E)’s “due to” clause clearly sets a limitation on claims for lost profits or 
impaired earning capacity.  What remains to be determined is how best to understand it.  On this 
issue, guidance can be found from a variety of sources, including: the common law regimes from 
which OPA departs, the statute’s legislative history, judicial decisions interpreting OPA, and policy 
considerations.   
 
1.  Common Law Background 
Historically, and still today for claims arising from oil spills not governed by statutes such as 
TAPAA and OPA, liability is determined primarily by federal admiralty law and state law.  Admiralty 
law applies to accidents that occur on navigable waters and involve traditional maritime activities 
(e.g., shipping), even when those sorts of activities cause injuries on land.  For example, if a 
commercial boat being towed into a harbor catches fire, and the fire spreads to and destroys a 
nearby dock, a claim by the dock owner against the owner or operator of the vessel will be governed 
by admiralty law.
56  Accidents that occur on land, or on navigable waters but not from traditional 
maritime activities, are typically governed by state tort law.  Unlike OPA, admiralty law and state 
common law generally require proof of fault as a condition of liability for harms resulting from the 
accidental discharge of oil.   
Substantive admiralty law is for the most part a body of common law – that is, a set of rules 
formulated by federal courts in the course of deciding particular disputes.  One such rule of long 
standing is the so-called “pure economic loss” rule, first announced by Justice Holmes for the 
                                                 
56 The substantive liability rules of federal admiralty law have been developed primarily by federal courts.  In many 
instances, those courts have chosen to flesh out the content of admiralty law by adopting rules of state tort law that have 
received widespread acceptance.  In addition, if in a given case for which there is no admiralty-law rule, and no need for 
national uniformity with respect to the matter that would be governed by the rule, federal courts will apply a particular 
state’s tort law.  E.g., Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 310, 314 (1955). 26 
 
Supreme Court in the 1927 decision Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint.
57  Flint had chartered a 
steamship from the ship’s owner.  Under the terms of the charter, Flint was required to take the 
steamship for periodic servicing.  During a service call, employees of the defendant’s dry dock 
carelessly damaged the ship, causing the plaintiff-charterer to lose use of the ship for two weeks, and 
to suffer lost profits that he would have made had it been available during that time.  The Supreme 
Court ruled that, notwithstanding the evidence of fault on the part of the dry dock owner, admiralty 
law did not provide Flint, as charterer of the boat, with a remedy against the dry dock owner.  It 
reasoned that the dry dock owner’s duty to be careful not to damage the ship was owed only to the 
owner of the boat. 
Although Robins was decided more than eighty years ago, federal courts applying admiralty 
law have consistently upheld it since then.  Thus, it is today still the rule in admiralty that careless 
conduct causing pure economic loss – as opposed to negligence causing physical damage to one’s 
property – is not actionable.  For example, in Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. M/V Testbank, a ship collision 
caused by a careless pilot resulted in the release of toxins that in turn caused a harbor to close for 
several weeks.
58  The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, reaffirming Robins, ruled that businesses in the 
immediate area, including restaurants and suppliers who depended on maritime activity at the harbor 
for customers, could not recover from the careless pilot or the company that employed him.  Rather, 
liability extended only to those who owned property physically damaged by the accident.
59    
In contrast to admiralty law, state tort law is developed primarily by state-court judges.  And 
although there is no requirement that state tort law adopt the rules of federal admiralty law, most 
                                                 
57 275 U.S. 303 (1927). 
58 752 F.2d 1019 (5th Cir. 1985) (en banc), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 903 (1986); see also In re Taira Lynn Marine Ltd. No. 
5, LLC v. Jays Seafood, Inc., 444 F.3d 371, 378-79 (5th Cir. 2006); Barber Lines A/S v. M/V Donau Maru, 764 F.2d 50, 
57 (1st Cir. 1985) (Breyer, J.); Getty Refining and Mktg. Co., v. MT Fadi B, 766 F.2d 829, 833 (3d Cir. 1985); Hercules 
Carriers, Inc. v. Florida, 720 F.2d 1201, 1202 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 835 (1984); Federal Commerce & 
Navigation Co. v. M/V Marathonian, 528 F.2d 907, 908 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 975 (1976).   
59 The Court of Appeals had no occasion to consider the propriety of the district court’s decision to exempt from 
the Robins rule claims by commercial fishermen.  752 F.2d at 1021 n. 2. 27 
 
state courts have in fact adopted the pure economic loss rule.
60  Suppose a tanker-truck driver were 
carelessly to crash, causing the release of a toxic chemical, which in turn causes authorities to close 
the road on which the truck was traveling.  Because of the closure, nearby stores, to which the road 
provides direct access, experience a downturn in business and lost profits.  In the vast majority of 
states – perhaps every state – the careless truck driver will not be held liable to the store owners 
even though the truck driver’s carelessness actually caused the store owners to suffer losses.  As did 
the U.S. Supreme Court in Robins, state high courts have reasoned that the driver’s duty to avoid 
injury through careful driving is a duty to avoid causing personal injury or property damage, not a 
duty to avoid causing economic loss, even when such loss is a foreseeable consequence of careless 
                                                 
60 General Elec. Co. v. Lowe’s Home Centers, Inc., 608 S.E.2d 636, 638 (Ga. 2005); Nebraska Innkeepers, Inc. v. 
Pittsburgh-Des Moines Corp., 345 N.W.2d 124, 128 (Iowa 1984); PPG Indus., Inc. v. Bean Dredging, 447 So.2d 1058, 
1059-60 (La. 1984); FMR Corp. v. Boston Edison Co., 613 N.E.2d 902, 903 (Mass. 1993); Local Joint Exec. Bd. of Las 
Vegas, Culinary Workers Union v. Stern, 651 P.2d 637, 638 (Nev. 1982); Border Brook Terrace Condo. Ass’n v. 
Gladstone, 622 A.2d 1248, 1253 (N.H. 1993); 532 Madison Ave. Gourmet Foods Inc. v. Finlandia Ctr. Inc., 750 N.E.2d 
1097, 1102-03 (N.Y. 2001); Vogel v. Reed Supply Co., 177 S.E.2d 273, 279 (N.C. 1970); Queen City Terminals, Inc. v. 
General American Transp. Corp., 653 N.E.2d 661, 667 (Ohio 1995); Oregon Steel Mills, Inc. v. Coopers & Lybrand, 83 
P.3d 322, 328 (Or. 2004); Duquesne Light Co. v. Pa. Am. Water Co., 850 A.2d 701, 703-04 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004); United 
Textile Workers of America, AFL-CIO v. Lear Siegler Seating Corp., 825 S.W.2d 83, 87 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990); Coastal 
Conduit & Ditching, Inc. v. Noram Energy Corp., 29 S.W.3d 282, 288 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000); O’Connell v. Killington, 
Ltd., 665 A.2d 39, 43 (Vt. 1995); Aikens v. Debow, 541 S.E.2d 576, 589 (W. Va. 2000); see also Sawyer v. Bailey, 413 A.2d 
165, 168 (Me. 1980). 
Courts also invoke a variant on the pure economic loss rule when holding that parties to a contract, including a 
contract for the sale of a product, cannot invoke negligence or products liability law in place of contract law to recover 
for a breach of contract that results in economic loss to the non-breaching party.  For non-product cases, see, e.g., 
Flagstaff Affordable Hous. Ltd. P’ship v. Design Alliance, Inc., 223 P.3d 664, 670 (Ariz. 2010); Grynberg v. Agri Tech, 
Inc., 10 P.3d 1267, 1271 (Colo. 2000); Ass’n of Apartment Owners v. Venture 15, Inc., 167 P.3d 225, 288 (Haw. 2007); 
Tusch Enter. v. Coffin, 740 P.2d 1022, 1026 (Idaho 1987).  For product cases, see, e.g., Danforth v. Acorn Structures, 
Inc., 608 A.2d 1194, 1198 (Del. 1991); Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Nat’l Tank Co., 435 N.E.2d 443, 448 (Ill. 1982); Gunkel v. 
Renovations, Inc., 822 N.E.2d 150, 153 (Ind. 2005); Rinaldo’s Constr. Corp. v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 559 N.W.2d 647, 658 
(Mich. 1997); Franklin Grove Corp. v. Drexel, 936 A.2d 1272, 1275 (R.I. 2007); SME Indus., Inc. v. Thompson, 
Ventulett, Stainback and Assoc., Inc., 28 P.3d 669, 681-82 (Utah 2001).   The U.S. Supreme Court has incorporated a 
version of the economic loss rule for products into federal admiralty law.  East River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica 
Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858 (1986).   
For treatise acknowledgements of the continuing recognition of the economic loss rule, see DAN B. DOBBS, THE 
LAW OF TORTS § 452, at 1282 (2000) (“When commercial or economic harm stands alone, divorced from injury to 
person or property, courts have not imposed a general duty of reasonable care.”); 4 FOWLER V. HARPER, ET AL., 
HARPER, JAMES & GRAY ON TORTS § 25.18A, at 766 (3d ed. 2007) (“Under the prevailing rule in America a plaintiff may 
not recover in negligence for economic loss not resulting from bodily harm or from physical damage to property in 
which the plaintiff has no proprietary interest.”); W. PAGE KEETON, ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS § 129, at 
100 (5th ed. 1984) (noting virtual absence of authority for the imposition of liability for negligence causing economic 
loss apart from physical damage to person or property). 28 
 
driving.
61  Other courts express this same idea in the language of proximate cause.  The causal 
pathway from carelessness to loss, they maintain, is too indirect to support liability, in part because, 
in a case like the one just described, it turns on the autonomous decisions of consumers to refrain 
from frequenting the stores.
62  The economic loss rule, therefore, is as much a part of state tort law 
as federal admiralty law.
63  
Various rationales have been offered for the economic loss rule.  It is defended as necessary 
to fend off excessive or disproportionate liability.  Practically any accident will have economic ripple-
effects that extend broadly over time and space.  There is thus a need to set limits on liability, 
especially when the basis for liability is negligence, which sets a relatively low culpability threshold.  
A momentary lapse can count as “negligence” in the eyes of the law, and yet might cause an 
economic catastrophe: a simple mistake by an employee at a power plant could conceivably cause a 
blackout in a major city that results in hundreds of millions of dollars of lost revenues.  Another 
rationale is that a person’s ongoing prospects for profits, though surely of great importance to her, 
are already vulnerable to an array of forces, including lawful economic competition, technological 
innovation, and changes in consumer preferences.  As such, this interest warrants less fulsome legal 
protection than does the interest of a person in the physical integrity of her person or possessions.  
Also, because accidents promise to affect adversely the economic well-being of a broad universe of 
potential claimants, and because proof of economic loss and causation for economic loss claims will 
often be speculative, such claims arguably raise special concerns about the costs and reliability of 
                                                 
61 Aikens, 541 S.E.2d at 583-87 (denying recovery on similar facts). 
62 E.g., Petitions of Kinsman Transit Co., 388 F.2d 821, 824-25 (2d Cir. 1968); Rickards v. Sun Oil Co., 41 A.2d 267, 
268 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1945). 
63 Liability for economic loss often will attach, however, when there is a particular undertaking by the defendant to 
take care against causing an economic loss to a particular beneficiary or set of beneficiaries.  For example, in most states, 
an accounting firm (A) that is hired by a company (C) to audit C’s books to re-assure a particular potential investor (P) 
of C’s economic soundness can face liability to P if the audit is performed carelessly so as to cause P to lose money on 
the investment that P would not have lost had A used appropriate care in performing the audit.  RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1977). 29 
 
civil litigation.
64  In cases in which the resources available to provide compensation to the injured are 
limited, there is in addition reason to prioritize claims for physical injury and property damage over 
claims for lost profits.
65 
Although the pure economic loss rule is thus well-entrenched as a matter of both federal 
admiralty law and state tort law, in a handful of decisions it has been adjusted to permit relief to 
certain claimants whose claims arguably should be barred by the rule, strictly construed.  In 
admiralty law, the most notable example of this sort of adjustment is the allowance of claims by 
commercial fishermen alleging lost profits resulting from negligence causing harm to fishing 
stocks.
66  Commercial fishermen do not own fish that they have yet to catch – they cannot claim that 
harm to uncaught fish amounts to harm to their property.  They would therefore seem to fall within 
the class of persons whose claims, if brought under admiralty law, would be barred by the Robins 
rule.  Yet some courts applying admiralty and state law have granted them an exemption, reasoning, 
that they “lawfully and directly make use of a resource of the sea, viz. its fish, in the ordinary course 
of their business.  This type of use is entitled to protection from negligent conduct ….”
67 
                                                 
64 See Barber Lines A/S, 764 F.2d at 54-55; see generally Dan B. Dobbs, An Introduction to Non-Statutory Economic Loss 
Claims, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 713, 715-17 (2006) (reviewing rationales for the pure economic loss rule). 
65 Cf. Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424, 435-36 (1997) (noting that claimants seeking 
recovery for the cost of future medical monitoring are often competing for limited resources with claimants seeking 
recovery for personal injuries). 
66 THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAW § 12-7, at 795 (4th ed. 2004) (“A longstanding line 
of cases grants recovery for lost profits to commercial fishermen whose activities are disrupted as a result of pollution or 
other casualty.”).   The leading modern decision is probably Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558, 570 (9th Cir. 1974).  In 
the Testbank decision, noted in the text above, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals observed that the trial court had 
applied the commercial fisherman exception, but neither endorsed nor rejected it.  752 F.2d at 1021 n. 2. 
67 Oppen, 501 F.2d at 570.  For a state-law counterpart to Oppen, see Curd v. Mosaic Fertilizer, 39 So.3d 1216, 1227-28 
(Fla. 2010).  In Oppen, the Ninth Circuit emphasized that “[n]othing said in this opinion is intended to suggest, for 
example, that every decline in the general commercial activity of every business in the Santa Barbara area following the 
[oil spill] of 1969 constitutes a legally cognizable injury for which defendants may be responsible.”  Id.  Courts have 
followed Oppen in resisting efforts to extend recovery more generally to persons who suffer losses because of damage to 
property that they do not own.  See, e.g., General Foods Corp. v. United States, 448 F. Supp. 111 (D. Md. 1978) (no 
liability for economic losses caused by defendants’ careless damaging of railroad bridge on which plaintiff relied for 
transportation of goods to and from its plant).  Indeed, some courts have not even allowed the commercial fishermen 
exception to apply if the particular fishermen claiming economic loss do not hold a commercial fishing license.   
SCHOENBAUM, supra note 66, at 795 n. 15. 
One can argue that the allowance of claims by commercial fisherman on the ground that they have a legally 
protected interest in appropriating uncaught fish for commercial use runs counter to the immediate holding of Robins, 30 
 
In a similar fashion, a handful of state courts have provided relief from the strictures of the 
pure economic loss rule to claimants that have suffered economic losses because of a careless 
interference with a legally protected interest in the use of certain property that falls short of outright 
ownership.
68  In People Express Airlines, Inc. v. Consolidated Rail Corp., the New Jersey Supreme Court 
famously permitted recovery by an airline for lost bookings that occurred when the airline’s 
employees were forced to evacuate their business offices, located in a Newark Airport terminal, 
because of the defendant’s careless release of toxic gases.
69  Similarly, in J’aire Corp. v. Gregory, the 
California Supreme Court permitted a restaurant operating in leased space in an airport to recover 
for lost business resulting from the defendant’s careless delay in repairing the airport’s HVAC 
system, which rendered the tenant’s space unusable during the period of delay.
70    
In allowing recovery at or just beyond the margins of the economic loss rule, the New Jersey 
and California courts purported to reject the rule outright.  In its place, they called for a context-
specific inquiry into whether a duty of care to avoid causing economic loss was owed to a given 
claimant or class of claimants on the ground that economic loss to that claimant or class was an 
especially foreseeable consequence of the defendant’s carelessness.
71  In their results, however, these 
cases do not so much replace the rule as relax it by granting to persons with use-rights in certain 
property the power to sue for economic losses caused by careless acts that damage the property or 
                                                                                                                                                             
which, after all, declined to treat the plaintiff charterer’s legally protected interest in use of the chartered boat as a basis 
for allowing recovery for economic loss.  Two federal courts of appeals have in fact qualified Robins’ particular 
application of the pure economic loss rule to charterers, though they have not questioned the rule itself.  Venore Transp. 
Co. v. M/V Struma, 583 F.2d 708 (4th Cir. 1978) (permitting recovery for the cost of chartering a boat, but not lost 
profits, suffered during the period that the boat was rendered unusable by defendant’s carelessness); National Steel Corp. 
v. Great Lakes Towing Co., 574 F.2d 339 (6th Cir. 1978) (same).  
68 Curd, 39 So.3d at 1227-28; Mattingly v. Sheldon Jackson Coll., 743 P.2d 356, 361 (Alaska 1987); J'Aire Corp. v. 
Gregory, 598 P.2d 60, 65-66 (Cal. 1979); People Express Airlines, Inc. v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 495 A.2d 107, 116 
(N.J. 1985); see also Edward F. Heimbrock Co., Inc. v. Marine Sales and Serv., Inc., 766 S.W.2d 70,  71-72 (Ky. Ct. App. 
1989) (citing People Express, but distinguishing it). 
69 495 A.2d at 118; see also Robert L. Rabin, Respecting Boundaries and the Economic Loss Rule in Tort, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 
857, 858 (2006) (noting that People Express “stands as a lonely outpost” and that its invitation to expand liability for 
economic loss has not been embraced by courts in other states). 
70 J’aire, 598 P.2d at 61, 66. 
71 People Express, 495 A.2d at 115-16. 31 
 
render it unavailable.  In other words, what renders these claimants ‘especially foreseeable’ is 
precisely that they enjoy a particular right to use certain property, but are prevented from exercising 
it by the defendant’s carelessness.  Thus, even in the handful of states with a relatively expansive 
approach to liability for negligently caused economic loss, the pattern of actual liability, as opposed 
to some of the abstract language of judicial pronouncements, overwhelmingly limits liability to 
instances in which careless conduct renders particular property unusable by persons who have a 
right and a commercial need to use it, which right is exclusive to those persons, or at least held only 
by a limited class of right-holders.  And again, even these adjustments to the economic loss rule are 
not firmly established.  The U.S. Supreme Court has yet to endorse the lower-court decisions that 
recognize the right of commercial fishermen to recover for lost profits caused by harm to uncaught 
fish.
72  Likewise, the vast majority of state courts have not adopted the rationales or even the results 
in cases such as People Express and J’aire. 
A longstanding canon of statutory construction holds that when statutes depart from 
common law (including admiralty law), those departures should be construed narrowly.
73  To be 
sure, where Congress clearly indicates an intention to depart dramatically from common law, that 
intention controls.
74  And Section 2702(b)(2)(E)’s use of the phrase “any claimants” does indicate 
that OPA is designed to eliminate the existence of an ownership or lease interest in property or 
resources damaged by a spill as a prerequisite to recovery of economic losses.
75  However, the same 
section’s “due to” clause equally clearly indicates that not all such claimants are permitted to recover.  
                                                 
72 See Barasich v. Shell Pipeline Co., L.P., Nos. 05-4180, 05-4197, 05-4199, 05-4212, 05-4512, 06-5102, 2006 WL 
3913403, at *6 & n.1 (E.D. La. Nov. 20, 2006) (denying commercial fisherman recovery for spill-related economic losses 
under admiralty and Louisiana tort law, and noting that the commercial fishermen’s exception “has never been formally 
recognized by the Fifth Circuit or the United States Supreme Court.”). 
73 Shaw v. Railroad Co., 101 U.S. 557, 565 (1879) (“No statute is to be construed as altering the common law, 
farther than its words import.  It is not to be construed as making any innovation upon the common law which it does 
not fairly express.”).   
74 Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson, 343 U.S. 779, 783 (1952). 
75 Representative Jones, the House sponsor of the bill that became OPA, used the phrase “standing” to explain the 
significance of the “any claimant” language.  135 CONG. REC. 26788, 26851 (Nov. 1, 1989).  So too did Representative 
Stangeland.  136 CONG. REC. 22131, 22289 (Aug. 3, 1990) (identifying fishermen and beachfront property owners as 
having “standing” to bring economic loss claims).   32 
 
A reading of the section in light of the presumption favoring narrow derogation is thus appropriate.  
It suggests that Congress’s aim in enacting Section 2702(b)(2)(E) was to extend liability along the 
lines tentatively identified by judicial decisions that have pushed the boundaries of the economic loss 
rule.  To say the same thing: OPA’s economic loss provisions are best understood as expanding 
liability for economic loss beyond owners and lessees of property that has been damaged to any 
person whose business’s profitability depends on his or her ability to exercise a right physically to 
obtain or use property or resources that are damaged or lost because of an oil spill.  This would 
include, most obviously, commercial fishermen who are deprived of physical access to fishing 
stocks, or deprived of the use of boats and other equipment that they do not own or lease but that 
they use to fish.  It would also extend liability to owners of commercial beachfront property that is 
not itself contaminated with oil, but is located in the immediate vicinity of coastal waters or 
shorelines that have suffered pollution, and thus interferes with actual use of their properties as 
hotels, resorts, and the like.   
Reading OPA in this manner makes sense of the “due to” clause’s linkage of recovery for 
economic loss to property or resources being damaged or made physically unavailable.  Economic 
loss is “due to” property or resource damage, or loss, when profits or earnings suffer because the 
damage, or loss, prevents or hinders the claimant from putting that property or those resources to 
commercial use, as is her right.  Any claimant who has such a use-right – regardless of whether the 
right amounts to an ownership or lease interest – stands to recover.  
It could be argued that OPA, so read, accomplishes very little because it merely replicates 
schemes of liability already in place under admiralty law and state tort law.  This objection is 
misguided.  As mentioned above, only a few decisions allow liability for economic losses caused to 
persons with a right to use particular property or resources for commercial purposes, and even they 
have tended to recognize only claims by persons who enjoy an exclusive right to use particular 33 
 
property, such as the leaseholders in People Express and J’aire.  The Supreme Court likewise has never 
signed off on the exception in admiralty law, recognized by some lower federal courts, for 
commercial fishermen who are licensed to fish in certain waters.  In giving decisions such as these a 
firm statutory basis, OPA did not merely tweak the existing liability landscape.  It firmly established 
a large domain of liability for economic loss.  Moreover, although it seems likely that OPA was 
meant primarily to benefit persons with exclusive or near-exclusive rights to use particular property 
or resources damaged or rendered unavailable by a spill, there is an argument to be made – discussed 
below – that liability extends to certain additional claimants, again suggesting that the statute’s 
economic loss provisions have real bite as compared to liability under common law. 
 
2.  Legislative History 
The case for interpreting Section 2702(b)(2)(E) as designed primarily to protect actual 
rightful users of property and resources that are damaged or lost because of a spill is strengthened by 
attention to OPA’s legislative history.  Members of Congress on several occasions specifically 
identified these first-line users of property and resources, such as commercial fishermen and owners 
of beachfront properties, as the primary beneficiaries of that section.  Here are the comments from 
the provision-by-provision analysis contained in the House Conference Report:  
Subsection (b)(2)(E) provides that any claimant may recover for loss of profits or 
impairment of earning capacity resulting from injury to property or natural resources.  
The claimant need not be the owner of the damaged property or resources to 
recover for lost profits or income.  For example, a fisherman may recover lost 
income due to damaged fisheries resources, even though the fisherman does not 
own those resources.
76 
 
A 1990 Senate Report likewise focused on claims by fishermen, explicitly linking recovery under 
Section 2702(b)(2)(E) to a claimant’s inability to use property and resources: 
                                                 
76 H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 101-653, at 104 (1990). 34 
 
[The damages provisions of subsection (b)(2)] are intended to provide compensation 
for a wide range of injuries and are not so narrowly focused as to prevent victims of 
an oil spill from receiving reasonable compensation.  For example, economic 
damages include both loss of use and loss of subsistence use of natural resources.  
Under this provision, fishermen, for example, would not only receive the equivalent 
of unemployment compensation, but would also receive compensation to prevent 
loss of a boat.  Lost wages are of limited value if the means of earning wages, such as 
a boat, go uncompensated.
77   
 
As is plainly suggested by this excerpt, Section 2702(b)(2)(E) was meant to operate as the commercial 
use counterpart to Section 2702(b)(2)(C)’s provision of compensation for interferences with 
subsistence use of natural resources.   
Other comments on the House bill further demonstrate the sort of economic loss claimant 
Congress aimed to empower to recover compensation.  Representative Stangeland emphasized that 
Section 2702(b)(2)(E) would hold polluters liable for “government cleanup costs, natural resource 
damages, and economic damages to third parties such as fishermen and beachfront property 
owners.”
78 Citing the inadequacies of pre-OPA law, Representative Schneider decried the fact that, 
one year after the World Prodigy spill in Narragansett Bay, “[t]he economic losses incurred by shell 
fishermen and related business are still being felt.”
79  Representative Studds advocated for OPA as a 
guarantee “that our fishermen and beachfront property owners will be compensated promptly and 
in full for any oil spill damages they might suffer.”
80   
 
3.  Judicial Interpretation 
The few extant judicial applications of Section 2702(b)(2)(E) are entirely consistent with the 
understanding of OPA offered here, though at least two courts have adopted arguably narrower 
                                                 
77 S. REP. NO. 101-94, at 12 (1990) (emphasis added).    
78 136 CONG. REC. 22131, 22289 (Aug. 3, 1990).   
79 136 CONG. REC. 15077, 15368 (June 21, 1990). 
80 135 CONG. REC. 26904, 26934 (Nov. 2, 1989).  Representative Jones, the sponsor of the House bill (H.R. 1465), 
described the economic loss provisions contained in it – which were eventually displaced by the economic-loss provision 
contained in the Senate bill – as entailing “that a worker at a coastal hotel might have standing to bring a claim for 
damages even though he owns no property which has been injured as a result of a discharge from oil.  In addition, the 
loss of earnings from seasonal activities is included.”  H. REP. NO. 101-242, Pt. 2, at 57 (1989).    35 
 
interpretations of the statute’s provisions for economic loss liability.
81  In Sekco Energy, Inc. v. M/V 
Margaret Chouest, the defendant chartered a boat to tow cable containing mineral oil.
82  While being 
towed, the cable collided with plaintiff’s stationary offshore drilling platform.  The platform suffered 
no damage, but some mineral oil was released, causing the platform to be shut down while the spill 
was investigated.  The district court allowed the plaintiff’s claim for compensation for lost profits 
incurred during the shutdown, reasoning that the spill had temporarily caused the plaintiff to lose 
the use of its property.  As the court emphasized, the defendant’s interference with the plaintiff’s 
right to operate its platform is exactly the sort of interference-with-use-rights that Section 
2702(b)(2)(E) addresses.
83  Likewise, in In Re Settoon Towing, LLC the district court refused to dismiss 
claims for economic losses suffered “as a result of [claimant’s] alleged inability to access its 
production platform” because of a release of oil that resulted from a collision between a ship and a 
well owned by someone other than the claimant.
84  Dunham-Price Group, LLC v. Citgo Petroluem Corp. 
permitted recovery for losses resulting from a spill that caused the closure of a river, in turn causing 
the claimant “‘loss of use, increased expense, business interruption and related damages.’”
85 
 
4.   Policy Considerations 
The question of OPA’s proper interpretation – of what liability scheme Congress actually 
put into place – is distinct from the question of whether OPA’s liability provisions are optimally 
designed to realize certain goals or principles.  However, it would presumably count against an 
                                                 
81 See In re Taira Lynn Marine Ltd. No. 5, LLC, 444 F.3d 371 (5th Cir. 2006) (no recovery under admiralty law or 
OPA for businesses that suffer economic losses when defendants’ release of airborne gases resulted in officials ordering 
the closure of the sole public access route to the area in which the plaintiff-businesses operated); In re Cleveland Tankers, 
791 F. Supp. 669 (E.D. Mich. 1992) (denying recovery for economic loss under admiralty law and OPA for the sinking 
of tanker that partially blocked a channel that plaintiffs used to transport goods).      
82 820 F. Supp. 1008 (E.D. La. 1993).   
83 Id. at 1012. 
84 No. 07-1263, 2009 WL 4730969, at *2 (E.D. La. Dec 4, 2009). 
85 No. 2:07 CV 1019, 2010 WL 1285446, at *1 - *2 (W.D. La. Mar. 31, 2010) (quoting claimant’s complaint); see also 
FGCI, LLC v. M/V Lorelay, 193 Fed. Appx. 853, 2006 WL 2351835 (11th Cir. Aug. 15, 2006) (presuming OPA liability 
for a spill that deprived a grain elevator operator use of that facility). 36 
 
interpretation of OPA’s liability scheme if, on that interpretation, the scheme were to draw irrational 
or entirely arbitrary distinctions among classes of possible claimants.  No such problem is raised by 
the present interpretation of OPA’s economic loss provisions.  There are plausible reasons for 
limiting recovery for economic loss to persons who can establish that their losses resulted from 
harm to property or resources that interferes with their right to put that property or those resources 
to commercial use.  That there are such reasons supports the validity of an interpretation that has 
already been shown to comport with OPA’s text, the common law background against which the 
statute was enacted, and extant judicial interpretations of its economic loss provisions.   
OPA’s limitations on liability for economic loss share with the common law’s pure economic 
loss rule the idea that, as between claims for personal injury and property damage (on the one hand) 
and economic loss (on the other), the former are generally to be prioritized.  For a major spill, it is 
entirely possible, perhaps likely, that the compensation of the entire universe of provable economic 
loss claims would come at the expense of victims who have suffered personal injuries and property 
damage.  It might also come at the expense of those seeking reimbursement for clean-up costs.  For 
both of these reasons, as well as the reasons generally said to support the pure economic loss rule, it 
is sensible to read the statute as drawing limits on the set of economic loss claims that are 
compensable. 
Furthermore, within the class of economic loss claimants, the “due to” clause, as interpreted 
here, ensures that compensation will flow primarily to certain members of the communities most 
immediately and tangibly affected by a spill.  Losses from a spill are likely to be particularly 
concentrated – and therefore cumulative and particularly devastating – in communities populated 
heavily by persons whose livelihoods depend on the use of resources, land, structures, and 
equipment that have been physically harmed or rendered unusable by a spill.    37 
 
In addition, certain other forms of economic loss, even grave loss, generate less compelling 
claims to a remedy.  Consider, for example, what might be termed “second-order” claims, such as a 
claim for lost profits by a big-box retail store, located several miles inland, that relies heavily on the 
patronage of workers whose jobs involve the use of coastal and marine resources.  Insofar as a spill 
has interfered with the ability of these workers to work and collect their wages, it will also tend to 
harm the store owner’s bottom-line.  And yet, by the same token, the provision of relief through 
OPA to these workers should redound to the benefit of second-order victims such as the retailer, as 
well as third- and fourth-order victims such as suppliers of the retailer and suppliers of the suppliers.  
Of course, one can hardly expect the compensation of first-order victims to fully compensate more 
remote victims.  Even first-line users of property and resources who are promptly and fairly 
compensated for lost profits and lost wages might change their spending habits or frequent different 
stores in response to a spill that has caused them economic loss.  The point is merely that, economic 
recovery, like economic loss, will tend to flow from immediate to more remote victims, and it would 
have been perfectly sensible for Congress to take this into account in devising a liability regime for 
economic loss resulting from oil spills.   
Finally, in drawing the line at recovery by immediate users of damaged property and 
resources, OPA precludes from recovery a potentially large class of claimants who arguably are less 
in need of a legal remedy because of their ability to respond in other ways to economic losses 
resulting from an oil spill.  These are claimants who suffer economic loss because of misinformation 
about the scope or severity of an accidental spill – for example, tourist destinations that lose 
business because of unwarranted public fears of pollution in that location, or seafood restaurants 
that lose business because of unfounded fears of contaminated seafood.
86  In many respects, these 
claimants resemble individuals and businesses who sue for economic losses caused by the careless 
                                                 
86 David Segal, Should BP’s Money Go Where Oil Didn’t?, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 24, 2010, at BU1) (suggesting that public 
misapprehension as to the scope of the spill has played a significant role in expanding the Spill’s economic impact). 38 
 
dissemination of false, defamatory information – for example, a prominent local restaurant that loses 
customers because a website has carelessly misidentified it as having served contaminated food.  In 
both of these situations, the economic loss suffered is most immediately caused by reputational 
harm resulting from the circulation of misinformation.  With respect to losses caused in this manner, 
as opposed to losses caused by physical damage to property or resources, state and local 
governments, as well as business and civic associations, are well-situated to respond through 
advertising campaigns and other means.  Their need for a legal remedy is thus arguably weaker.
87  It 
is true that individual small business owners and perhaps even small communities might lack the sort 
of resources and access that would permit them to respond effectively with a media campaign.   But 
they are almost certainly in a position to benefit from the ability of other actors, including state and 
local governments, to do so.  
 
 
                                                 
87 In a related context, the U.S. Supreme Court has set severe limits on recovery for even devastating economic loss 
flowing from misinformation.  Indeed, no recovery at all is permitted for economic loss caused by the accidental 
defamation of “public figures” – a category including governmental officials, prominent businesspersons, and, in some 
cases, businesses themselves – even defamation that results from gross carelessness.  Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 
U.S. 323, 336 n. 7 (1974); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 285-86 (1964).  The Court has justified this 
categorical liability limitation on several grounds.  One is that public figures can effectively respond to misinformation 
about them through the spread of true information.  Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344 (“Public officials and public figures usually 
enjoy significantly greater access to the channels of effective communication and hence have a more realistic opportunity 
to counteract false statements then private individuals normally enjoy.”).  While conceding that “an opportunity for 
rebuttal seldom suffices to undo harm of defamatory falsehood,” the Court nonetheless has concluded that public 
figures’ greater ability to combat misimpressions that have harmed them, and that threaten to continue to harm them, 
provides a reason to deny them a right to recover damages through a defamation suit.  Id. at 344 n. 9.   
It is important not to overstate this analogy.  The limits on defamation liability set by the Supreme Court are 
animated by a concern to protect free speech rights.  No equivalent concern is at stake when it comes to the imposition 
of liability for the indirect economic effects of oil spills.  The point is not to equate public-figure defamation claimants 
with claimants who suffer economic losses because of misinformation about the effects of an oil spill.  It is to observe 
that there is something distinctive about the latter class of claimants, as compared to those who suffer economic loss 
because of harm to their property or to property or resources they are entitled to use for commercial purposes.  It is also 
to observe that this distinctiveness – their ability to respond to misinformation through the spread of accurate 
information – would support a decision by Congress to treat them differently.  Like the other policy considerations 
discussed above, this one is highlighted not because it decisively favors limiting liability for economic loss, but because it 
demonstrates the intelligibility of the limits that OPA has established.  39 
 
D.  Application of Section 2702(b)(2)(E) 
 
The application of legal rules to particular claims generally requires detailed fact-finding and 
close scrutiny of those facts, which is, of course, the province of judges and juries.  Indeed, although 
OPA does not specifically provide for jury trials, claimants seeking recovery in federal court for 
economic losses resulting from a spill may enjoy a Seventh Amendment right to have those claims 
tried before a jury.
88  Still, even assuming that OPA claims do come with jury-trial rights, there will 
be occasion for judges to rule out, categorically, certain kinds of claims on the ground that they 
cannot reasonably be understood to fall within the orbit of liability established by OPA.  Doing so is 
an appropriate job for judges,
89 and will help ensure that the statute is applied predictability and 
consistently across cases and jurisdictions.  
Returning to the list of imagined claimants set out in Part III.B.2, above, one can place them 
into three categories: (1) those for whom the right to recover under OPA is clear, assuming they 
have adequate proof of damages and actual causation; (2) those for whom there is clearly no right to 
recover, and (3) those for whom there is probably no right to recover, but who could be deemed 
eligible to recover on a particular generous reading of OPA.
90   
                                                 
88 The Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial in federal court does not extend to suits that would have been 
brought in admiralty at the time of the Amendment’s ratification.  Whether an OPA claim for damages would be such a 
suit, or would instead be the sort of suit that, at that time, would have been brought under the common law, depends on 
the facts and theory of the particular case.  At least two lower courts have concluded that claims for damages under 
OPA do give rise to a right to a jury trial.  South Port Marine, LLC v. Gulf Oil Ltd. P’ship, 234 F.3d 58, 64 (1st Cir. 
2000); Clausen v. M/V New Carissa, 171 F.Supp.2d 1127, 1135 (D. Or. 2001).  
89 As noted above, the common law’s economic loss rule has primarily been fashioned as a judge-made and judge-
applied rule of “no duty” rather than as a matter appropriate for case-by-case determination by juries.  That it is so 
conceived supports the conclusion – already adopted in judicial practice – that judges are charged with the task of 
determining, at a general level, which categories of economic loss claimants ought to be able to recover under OPA.  It 
is true that, at common law, “proximate cause” has traditionally been regarded as a question for juries.  And yet insofar 
as the proximate cause inquiry calls for the setting categorical limits on responsibility, it is arguably better suited to 
judges.  See Benefiel v. Exxon Corp., 959 F.2d 805, 808 (9th Cir. 1992) (observing, in the context of ruling that certain 
categories of economic loss claims are not recoverable under TAPAA, that “[w]hile proximate or legal causation 
normally presents an issue for the trier of fact to resolve, both California and federal law recognize that where causation 
cannot reasonably be established under the facts alleged by a plaintiff, the question of proximate cause is one for the 
court.”). 
90 The following application of OPA’s rules to a set of imagined claims will provide some guidance on the scope of 
liability for economic loss under the statute.  However, the set of imagined claims obviously cannot hope to capture all 
the different sorts of economic loss claims that might be brought in the aftermath of a major oil spill.  Nor can the 40 
 
Those who clearly stand to recover upon an adequate showing of loss and actual causation 
include C, H, and E – the commercial fisherman deprived of access to fish because of a spill, the 
hotel owner who loses profits because neighboring beaches and waters that his customers tend to 
use are polluted, and the employee of that hotel who loses wages because of the hotel’s loss of 
business.  Each of these claimants seeks compensation for economic loss due to damage to, or loss 
of, property or resources to which the claimant has a right of access or use, and on which right the 
claimant’s economic well-being depends.  Each is also specifically identified in OPA’s legislative 
history as the kind of claimant who has suffered economic loss “due to” property or resource 
damage or loss.
91    
Claimant B – the barge owner denied access to the river on which the barge normally 
operates – probably also falls in the foregoing category.  On the other hand, B is not among those 
specifically mentioned in legislative history as entitled to recover.  Moreover, one could argue that 
access to navigable waters is a right enjoyed generally by the public rather than the particular right of 
persons whose businesses happen to require use of navigable waters.  That fact which could 
distinguish B’s claim from that of, for example, commercial fishermen who possess a license to 
catch and sell fish.
92  
                                                                                                                                                             
application of the statute to the imagined set of claims resolve in advance all legal questions pertaining to the resolution 
of the claims that are actually brought.  
91 That commercial fishermen are licensed to catch fish provides a particularly clear basis for concluding that they 
enjoy a use-right of the sort that Section 2702(b)(2)(E) is designed to protect and vindicate.  It does not follow that a 
formal license is required to establish liability for economic loss under OPA.  Nor does it follow that everyone who 
engages in licensed activity that is adversely affected by an oil spill can recover.  Under the reading of OPA offered here, 
a licensed cab driver who sees business drop because a spill has suppressed tourist demand for rides between a locality’s 
airport and its resorts has no claim for those losses.  The critical question, again, is whether the claimant has a right 
physically to access or use property or resources, which right has been interfered with because a spill has caused damage 
to or the loss of that property or those resources. 
92 This line of reasoning may be lurking behind two decisions, cited above, that deny recovery to actual OPA 
claimants who suffered economic losses in circumstances similar to those faced by imaginary claimant “B”.  In re Taira 
Lynn Marine Ltd. No. 5, LLC, 444 F.3d 371 (5th Cir. 2006) (no recovery under admiralty law or OPA for businesses that 
suffer economic losses when defendants’ careless release of airborne gases resulted in officials ordering the closure of 
the sole public access route to the area in which the businesses operated); In re Cleveland Tankers, 791 F. Supp. 669 
(E.D. Mich. 1992) (denying recovery for economic loss under admiralty law and OPA for the sinking of tanker that 
partially blocked a channel that plaintiffs used to transport goods). 41 
 
Turning from the category of those who are clearly eligible to recover from those who 
clearly are not, the latter includes all listed claimants from “O” through “L” (inclusive).  None of 
these claimants can establish that they have suffered economic losses “due to” property or resource 
damage or loss.  O, the innkeeper whose business suffers only because of a threat of imminent 
pollution damage that has not yet occurred, has not suffered losses because of his inability to access 
or use that property or those resources.  (If authorities had, in light of the threat, barred access to 
beachfront and waters routinely used by O’s customers, then the situation would be different.)  The 
same is true for F – who operates a fireworks store located 150 miles from any property and 
resources that have been lost or damaged.  Likewise for T, the tour boat operator who operates in 
waters that have not been polluted; D, the inland amusement park owner; N, the Nevada resort 
operator; M, the snorkeling equipment importer; S, the owner of the Phoenix seafood restaurant; G, 
the gas station owner in Boise; and L, the New York caterer.  Again, some of these claimants might 
well be able to prove that they have suffered economic loss because of the hypothesized spill.  They 
are nonetheless ineligible to recover because they cannot show that their right and ability to put 
certain property or resources to commercial use has been hindered by the spill’s having damaged, or 
deprived them of the use of, that property or those resources.    
Finally, there are claimants R, A, W – the restaurant owner, real estate agent, and the 
furniture store operator whose businesses reside in the immediate vicinity of a spill.  None of them 
are as-of-right commercial users of property that has been damaged or lost, or of resources that have 
been damaged or lost, because of the imagined spill.  Hence it would be entirely appropriate to 
conclude that they should not recover in light of OPA’s “due to” requirement.
93  On the other hand, 
their commercial activities are very closely bound up with local economies that revolve around the 
                                                 
93 Cf. Phillips v. G & H Seed Co., Inc., 10 So.3d 339 (La. Ct. App.) (denying recovery under state law of lost profits 
suffered by would-be buyers and processors of crawfish that were killed or sterilized as a result of exposure to pesticide 
manufactured and sold by the defendant), writ denied, 21 So.3d 284 (La. 2009). 42 
 
use of resources and property that have been damaged.  And there is some reason to suppose that 
Congress, acting with the Exxon Valdez spill very much in mind, was especially focused on the 
adverse economic effects of spills on the residents of shoreline communities physically affected by a 
spill.  We also have seen that the common law tradition has been to allow for marginal expansions 
of liability to claims that, strictly speaking, fall outside the liability limits set by case law, yet 
constitute a reasonably well-defined and limited class.  Given these considerations, it could 
conceivably be appropriate to interpret OPA generously to permit these claims.
94 
 
IV.  LIABILITY FOR ECONOMIC LOSS UNDER STATE LAW 
 
The analysis thus far has focused on potential liability under OPA for economic loss caused 
by an oil spill on navigable waters.  The federal statute, however, is not necessarily the only body of 
law that will govern such claims.  This is because OPA contemplates that, at least to some extent, 
states can enact and enforce liability rules in addition to OPA’s.  A detailed analysis of individual 
states’ liability rules for pollution-related economic losses is beyond the scope of this report.     
Nonetheless, it can offer some pertinent general observations.  Because the bulk of economic loss 
claims are likely to be asserted by businesses operating in the Gulf States, the focus will be on the 
laws of those states.
95 
 
A.  OPA’s Savings Clause 
Section 2718 of OPA contains a savings clause.  In relevant part, it reads as follows: 
                                                 
94 Although it is sometimes claimed that environmental statutes are “remedial” in nature, and therefore ought to be 
interpreted liberally, such claims remain contentious, at a minimum.  See  Blake A. Watson, Liberal Construction of 
CERCLA Under The Remedial Purpose Canon: Have the Lower Courts Taken a Good Thing Too Far?, 20 HARV. ENVTL L. REV. 
199 (1996) (noting a split between the U.S. Supreme Court and lower federal courts as to whether the canon of statutory 
interpretation that favors a liberal reading of “remedial” legislation applies to environmental protection statutes).   
95 Because state laws differ as to the scope of liability for economic loss resulting from an oil spill, a court 
entertaining a state-law claim for economic loss resulting from a spill may be required to apply choice-of-law rules to 
determine which state’s law will govern the resolution of that claim.  This report takes no position on choice-of-law 
issues. 43 
 
(a) … Nothing in this [statute] … shall –  
(1) affect, or be construed or interpreted as preempting, the authority of any 
State or political subdivision thereof from imposing any additional liability or 
requirements with respect to –  
(A) the discharge of oil or other pollution by oil within such State; or 
(B) any removal activities in connection with such a discharge; or  
(2) affect, or be construed or interpreted to affect or modify in any way the 
obligations or liabilities of any person under … State law, including common law. 
 
 …. 
 
(c) Nothing in this [statute] … shall in any way affect, or be construed to affect, the 
authority of the United States or any State or political subdivision thereof – 
(1)  to impose additional liability or additional requirements; or 
(2) to impose, or to determine the amount of, any fine or penalty (whether 
criminal or civil in nature) for any violation of law; 
relating to the discharge, or substantial threat of a discharge, of oil.
96 
 
In United States v. Locke, the Supreme Court had occasion to interpret Section 2718.
97   Faced 
with a conflict between Washington state law and federal laws concerning the safe operation of oil 
tankers, the Court concluded that the former were preempted by the operation of the Supremacy 
Clause of the U.S. Constitution.
98  The Court further concluded that Section 2718’s savings clause – 
which appears in the portion of OPA specifying rules for the recovery of clean-up costs and 
damages (Title I), and not in the part of the statute setting out vessel safety requirements – did not 
spare Washington’s laws because the latter involved “substantive regulation of a vessel’s primary 
conduct.”
99  Instead, said the Court, the savings clause is designed to leave states with room to 
“establish liability rules and financial requirements relating to oil spills.”
100  Locke therefore makes 
clear that OPA does not, as a general matter, preclude states from adopting alternative liability rules 
for oil spills on navigable waters, including rules that might call for more expansive liability for 
economic loss than those set by Section 2702(b)(2)(E).   
                                                 
96 33 U.S.C. § 2718(a), (c). 
97 529 U.S. 89 (2000). 
98 Id. at 94. 
99 Id. at 105. 
100 Id.   44 
 
 
B.  Scope of Liability Under Gulf-State Statutes 
 
Overwhelmingly, state common law liability for economic loss is less expansive than OPA 
liability.  As noted above, it typically requires proof of fault as a condition of liability for harms caused 
by accidental releases of oil.  And of course the very point of Section 2702(b)(2)(E) was to eliminate 
the common law’s economic loss rule as an automatic bar to recovery.  Even high courts that have 
purported to abandoned the rule, including those of California, Florida and New Jersey, have not 
actually imposed liability that is more expansive than the liability called for under Section 
2702(b)(2)(E).  Thus, if liability under state law for economic loss caused by a release of oil into 
navigable waters is going to be broader than it is under OPA, that outcome will almost certainly 
have to be accomplished by operation of state statute. 
Three states bordering the Gulf have enacted statutes that impose liability for harms related 
to oil spills: Florida, Louisiana and Texas.
101  Provisions for recovery in both the Louisiana and 
Texas statutes are worded in ways that seem to render their reach either less extensive or comparable 
to the reach of Section 2702(b)(2)(E).  The Texas Oil Spill Prevention and Response Act of 1991 
indicates by its plain terms that recovery for stand-alone economic loss is limited to users of lost or 
damaged property or resources, authorizing compensation to: 
persons, including but not limited to holders of an oyster lease or permit; persons 
owning, operating, or employed on commercial fishing, oystering, crabbing, or 
shrimping vessels; persons owning, operating, or employed by seafood processing 
concerns; and others similarly economically reliant on the use or acquisition of 
natural resources for any direct, documented loss of income, profits, or earning 
                                                 
101 Alabama and Mississippi have not adopted statutes that impose liability specifically for oil spills.  In addition, 
neither state’s high court appears to have issued an opinion clearly specifying the contours of common law liability for 
negligent conduct causing pure economic loss.  Cf. Public Bldg. Auth. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 2010 WL 
3937962, at *13 (Ala., Oct. 8, 2010) (reaffirming the version of the economic loss rule that prevents the buyer of a faulty 
product from invoking negligence law to impose liability for economic loss on the seller beyond the terms specified in 
the sales contract, but declining to apply that doctrine to a commercial construction contract); Flying J Fish Farm v. 
Peoples Bank of Greensboro, 12 So.3d 1185, 1195 (Ala. 2008) (bank owes no duty to take care to make sure that the 
recipient of a commercial loan will be in a position to repay it).   45 
 
capacity from the inability of the claimant to use or acquire natural resources arising 
solely from injury to the natural resources from an unauthorized discharge of oil.
102 
 
Louisiana’s Oil Spill Prevention and Response Act was likewise enacted on the heels of OPA, and 
indeed is modeled on it.  However, unlike OPA and the Texas statute, it does not appear to 
authorize any claims for economic loss divorced from harms to the claimant’s own property.   
Instead, the only damages identified as recoverable by a non-governmental entity are “damages for 
injury to, or economic loss resulting from destruction of, immovable or corporeal movable property, 
which shall be recoverable by a person who owns or leases that property.”
103   
Florida law contains two anti-pollution laws. The Pollutant Discharge Prevention and 
Control Act (“PDPCA”),
104 enacted in 1970, addresses the pollution of coastal waters and lands.   
The Water Quality Assurance Act (“WQAA”),
105 enacted in 1983, deals specifically with pollution of 
ground and surface waters.   
The PDPCA prohibits “[t]he discharge of pollutants into or upon any coastal waters, 
estuaries, tidal flats, beaches, and lands adjoining the seacoast of the state in the manner defined by 
[an earlier provision of the statute] ….”
106  It specifies that a party responsible for a discharge in 
violation of this prohibition is “liable to any affected person for all damages as defined in s. 376.031, 
excluding natural resource damages, suffered by that person as a result of the discharge.”
107  Section 
376.031 in turn defines damage in terms that seems to exclude economic loss, specifying it as: “the 
                                                 
102 TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 40.003(7)(a)(iii) (West 2009).  The underlying liability provision states that “any 
person responsible for an actual or threatened unauthorized discharge of oil from an offshore drilling or production 
facility is liable for all such damages from the actual or threatened discharge.” Id. § 40.202(b)(2) (emphasis added).  The 
provision quoted in the text is part of the statute’s definition of what counts as “damages.”   
103 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:2454(5)(b) (1990).  In Barasich v. Shell Pipeline Co., No. 05-4180, 2006 WL 3913403 
(E.D. La. Nov. 20, 2006) the federal district court noted that, as a matter of Louisiana law, commercial fisherman do not 
own or lease uncaught fish, whereas oyster farmers do have a property interest in oysters in leased oyster beds.   
Interestingly, although the Louisiana statute initially permitted recovery for lost profits and impaired earning capacity on 
the same terms as OPA, that provision was deleted by the state legislature in 1995.  LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:2454(5) 
(historical note) (stating that Acts 1995, No. 740 § 2, repealed sub-sections 30:2454(5)(e) and (f)). 
104 FLA. STAT. §§ 376.011-376.21 (2010). 
105 Id.  §§ 376.30-376.319. 
106 Id. § 376.041. 
107 Id. § 376.12(5). 46 
 
documented extent of any destruction to or loss of any real or personal property, or the documented 
extent, pursuant to § 376.121, of any destruction of the environment and natural resources, 
including all living things except human beings, as the direct result of the discharge of a pollutant.”
108    
WQAA, for its part, prohibits the discharge of pollutants and hazardous substances into or 
upon Florida surface water or groundwater.
109  With respect to liability for such discharges, Florida 
Statutes Section 376.313(3) states as follows: “nothing contained in [WQAA] prohibits any person 
from bringing a cause of action in a court of competent jurisdiction for all damages resulting from a 
discharge or other condition of pollution covered by [WQAA].”
110   
In Curd v. Mosaic Fertilizer, LLC the Florida Supreme Court recently had occasion to interpret 
both laws.
111  The case involved claims by commercial fishermen who alleged that they suffered lost 
profits because of a spill of chemicals from a land-based storage facility into Tampa Bay.  The spill 
resulted in harm to fish, crabs, and other marine life.  Reading WQAA’s “nothing contained” 
provision (section 376.313(3)) in conjunction with PDPCA’s definition of “damage” (section 
376.121), the Court concluded, somewhat cryptically, that the Florida legislature had provided for 
“private causes of action to any person who can demonstrate damages as defined under the 
statute.”
112   
At a minimum, Curd stands for the proposition that there are some persons who, under Florida 
law, can recover for economic loss without having to demonstrate that the discharge caused physical 
harm to property that they own or lease.  Who among these persons stands to recover is as yet 
unclear.  In a separate opinion, Justice Polston interpreted the Court to have decided for the 
fishermen only because they could make out a claim under WQAA, the statute that governs surface-
                                                 
108 Id. § 376.031(5).  The preface to Section 376.031 states that its definitions apply to the entirety of the PDPCA – 
i.e., Section 376.011-376.21 of the Florida Statutes – unless the context clearly requires otherwise.  Id. § 376.031. 
109 Id. § 376.302(1)(a). 
110 Id. § 376.313(3) (emphasis added). 
111 39 So.3d 1216 (Fla. 2010). 
112 Id. at 1222.  The court’s reference to “the statute” is cryptic because it appears to intermingle portions of two 
different statutes – PDPCA and WQAA – that contain different liability triggers and damages provisions.     47 
 
water and groundwater releases.
113  That statute – unlike PDPCA, which would govern liability for 
an offshore spill – does not have a provision that limits recoverable “damage” to harm to property 
or natural resources.
114  As Justice Polston also observed, the majority opinion declined to take up 
the invitation in the plaintiffs’ complaint to authorize recovery not just for commercial fisherman, 
but also for “distributors, seafood restaurants, fisheries, fish brokers, or the like, whose incomes 
might have been affected by [the] pollution.”
115  Likewise, he stressed that “the majority only 
addresses economic harm that resulted from the depletion of marine life and the resulting inability 
to harvest the commercial fishermen’s usual yield – not from harm to reputation as alleged in the 
petitioner’s complaint and mentioned by the Second District Court of Appeal.”
116  On this plausible 
reading of the court’s opinion – one which again sets as a condition of liability for economic loss the 
deprivation of physical access to property or resources that the claimant enjoys a legal right to use – 
Curd renders Florida law consistent with OPA.  Regardless, it is clear that the Florida Supreme Court 
did not take Curd to be an occasion on which to flesh out fully what sort of nexus between 
economic losses and property or resource damage will be required to support a finding of liability 
for economic loss as the result of a discharge of oil from an offshore facility.
117         
                                                 
113 Id. at 1229 (Polston, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
114 Id. at 1230 & n. 9. 
115 Id. at 1229. 
116 Id. 
117 As noted above, OPA’s savings clause indicates that states can adopt broader schemes of liability than are found 
in OPA.  However, even granted that OPA explicitly allows for such schemes, it is still possible that a particular state 
scheme of liability could be so broad as to conflict with the operation of OPA and hence be subject to preemption.  See 
Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 869 (2000) (although the savings clause in a federal motor vehicle safety 
statute blocks the inference that Congress meant generally to block states from adopting different safety requirements 
through common law liability, the clause does not bar the ordinary working of conflict preemption principles).  Such a 
conflict might arise, for example, if a state were to adopt a law that permits unbounded liability for economic loss, or for 
punitive damages, as a result of which a responsible party under OPA was put at risk of being unable to meet its OPA 
obligations to pay for removal costs and recoverable damages.  48 
 
CONCLUSION 
  The Deepwater Horizon spill has undoubtedly had severe economic consequences 
throughout the Gulf region, including in areas that have not been physically affected by the Spill.  
Under the federal Oil Pollution Act and parallel state laws, only some of these losses are recoverable 
from those responsible for the Spill.  To recover under OPA for economic loss caused by the Spill, a 
claimant must establish that his or her losses are due to damage or loss of property or resources, 
which damage or loss prevents the claimant from exercising a right to put that property or those 
resources to commercial use.  This limitation on liability is established by the plain text of the 
statute, and is supported by legislative history, judicial interpretation and policy considerations.  Gulf 
States’ common law and statutory law appear to set comparable or narrower limits on economic loss 
liability. 49 
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33 U.S.C. § 2702. Elements of liability 
(a) In general 
 
Notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law, and subject to the provisions of this Act, each responsible party 
for a vessel or a facility from which oil is discharged, or which poses the substantial threat of a discharge of oil, into 
or upon the navigable waters or adjoining shorelines or the exclusive economic zone is liable for the removal costs 
and damages specified in subsection (b) of this section that result from such incident. 
 
(b) Covered removal costs and damages 
 
(1) Removal costs  
 
The removal costs referred to in subsection (a) of this section are--  
 
(A) all removal costs incurred by the United States, a State, or an Indian tribe under subsection (c), (d), (e), 
or (l) of section 1321 of this title under the Intervention on the High Seas Act (33 U.S.C. 1471 et seq.), or 
under State law; and  
 
(B) any removal costs incurred by any person for acts taken by the person which are consistent with the 
National Contingency Plan.  
 
(2) Damages  
 
The damages referred to in subsection (a) of this section are the following:  
 
(A) Natural resources  
 
Damages for injury to, destruction of, loss of, or loss of use of, natural resources, including the reasonable 
costs of assessing the damage, which shall be recoverable by a United States trustee, a State trustee, an 
Indian tribe trustee, or a foreign trustee.  
 
(B) Real or personal property  
 
Damages for injury to, or economic losses resulting from destruction of, real or personal property, which 
shall be recoverable by a claimant who owns or leases that property.  
 
(C) Subsistence use  
 
Damages for loss of subsistence use of natural resources, which shall be recoverable by any claimant who 
so uses natural resources which have been injured, destroyed, or lost, without regard to the ownership or 
management of the resources.  
 
(D) Revenues  
 
Damages equal to the net loss of taxes, royalties, rents, fees, or net profit shares due to the injury, 
destruction, or loss of real property, personal property, or natural resources, which shall be recoverable by 
the Government of the United States, a State, or a political subdivision thereof.  
 
(E) Profits and earning capacity  
 
Damages equal to the loss of profits or impairment of earning capacity due to the injury, destruction, or loss 
of real property, personal property, or natural resources, which shall be recoverable by any claimant.  
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(F) Public services  
 
Damages for net costs of providing increased or additional public services during or after removal 
activities, including protection from fire, safety, or health hazards, caused by a discharge of oil, which shall 
be recoverable by a State, or a political subdivision of a State.  
 
 
33 U.S.C. § 2703. Defenses to liability 
(a) Complete defenses 
 
A responsible party is not liable for removal costs or damages under section 2702 of this title if the responsible party 
establishes, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the discharge or substantial threat of a discharge of oil and the 
resulting damages or removal costs were caused solely by-- 
 
(1) an act of God;  
 
(2) an act of war;  
 
(3) an act or omission of a third party, other than an employee or agent of the responsible party or a third 
party whose act or omission occurs in connection with any contractual relationship with the responsible 
party (except where the sole contractual arrangement arises in connection with carriage by a common 
carrier by rail), if the responsible party establishes, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the responsible 
party--  
 
(A) exercised due care with respect to the oil concerned, taking into consideration the characteristics of the 
oil and in light of all relevant facts and circumstances; and  
 
(B) took precautions against foreseeable acts or omissions of any such third party and the foreseeable 
consequences of those acts or omissions; or  
 
(4) any combination of paragraphs (1), (2), and (3).  
 
(b) Defenses as to particular claimants 
 
A responsible party is not liable under section 2702 of this title to a claimant, to the extent that the incident 
is caused by the gross negligence or willful misconduct of the claimant. 
 
33 U.S.C. § 2704. Limits on liability 
(a) General rule 
 
Except as otherwise provided in this section, the total of the liability of a responsible party under section 2702 of this 
title and any removal costs incurred by, or on behalf of, the responsible party, with respect to each incident shall not 
exceed-- 
 
(1) for a tank vessel, the greater of--  
 
(A) with respect to a single-hull vessel, including a single-hull vessel fitted with double sides only or a 
double bottom only, $3,000 per gross ton;  
 
(B) with respect to a vessel other than a vessel referred to in subparagraph (A), $1,900 per gross ton; or  
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(C)(i) with respect to a vessel greater than 3,000 gross tons that is--  
 
(I) a vessel described in subparagraph (A), $22,000,000; or  
 
(II) a vessel described in subparagraph (B), $16,000,000; or  
 
(ii) with respect to a vessel of 3,000 gross tons or less that is--  
 
(I) a vessel described in subparagraph (A), $6,000,000; or  
 
(II) a vessel described in subparagraph (B), $4,000,000;  
 
(2) for any other vessel, $950 per gross ton or $800,000, whichever is greater;  
 
(3) for an offshore facility except a deepwater port, the total of all removal costs plus $75,000,000; and  
 
(4) for any onshore facility and a deepwater port, $350,000,000.  
 
(b) Division of liability for mobile offshore drilling units 
 
(1) Treated first as tank vessel  
 
For purposes of determining the responsible party and applying this Act and except as provided in 
paragraph (2), a mobile offshore drilling unit which is being used as an offshore facility is deemed to be a 
tank vessel with respect to the discharge, or the substantial threat of a discharge, of oil on or above the 
surface of the water.  
 
(2) Treated as facility for excess liability  
 
To the extent that removal costs and damages from any incident described in paragraph (1) exceed the 
amount for which a responsible party is liable (as that amount may be limited under subsection (a)(1) of 
this section), the mobile offshore drilling unit is deemed to be an offshore facility. For purposes of applying 
subsection (a)(3) of this section, the amount specified in that subsection shall be reduced by the amount for 
which the responsible party is liable under paragraph (1).  
 
(c) Exceptions 
 
(1) Acts of responsible party  
 
Subsection (a) of this section does not apply if the incident was proximately caused by--  
 
(A) gross negligence or willful misconduct of, or  
 
(B) the violation of an applicable Federal safety, construction, or operating regulation by,  
 
the responsible party, an agent or employee of the responsible party, or a person acting pursuant to a 
contractual relationship with the responsible party (except where the sole contractual arrangement arises in 
connection with carriage by a common carrier by rail).  
 
(2) Failure or refusal of responsible party  
 
Subsection (a) of this section does not apply if the responsible party fails or refuses--  
 
(A) to report the incident as required by law and the responsible party knows or has reason to know of the 
incident;  
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(B) to provide all reasonable cooperation and assistance requested by a responsible official in connection 
with removal activities; or  
 
(C) without sufficient cause, to comply with an order issued under subsection (c) or (e) of section 1321 of 
this title or the Intervention on the High Seas Act (33 U.S.C. 1471 et seq.).  
 
(3) OCS facility or vessel  
 
Notwithstanding the limitations established under subsection (a) of this section and the defenses of section 
2703 of this title, all removal costs incurred by the United States Government or any State or local official 
or agency in connection with a discharge or substantial threat of a discharge of oil from any Outer 
Continental Shelf facility or a vessel carrying oil as cargo from such a facility shall be borne by the owner 
or operator of such facility or vessel.  
 
 